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ABSTRACT 
 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 was an unmitigated disaster for the United Kingdom.  
For the vast majority of historians, it marks the effective downfall of the British Empire.  
In reviewing the series of events preceding and throughout the crisis, it becomes evident 
that the reason for the failure of the Suez expedition rests not on actions taken in Cairo or 
Moscow, but in Washington.  The efforts of Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles 
to stymie Anthony Eden from achieving his goals during the affair are the key factors to 
the ruination of British efforts towards removing Gamal Abdel Nasser from power and 
reversing his nationalization of the Suez Canal.  By examining the Suez Crisis, much 
light is shed on the true nature of Anglo-American diplomacy during the early Cold War 
period; tense questions arise about the reality of the “special relationship” between the 
United States and Great Britain.  However, one fact remains certain, in the desert sands of 
the Sinai Peninsula during November 1956, Britannia lost her Empire and America 
asserted its dominance.                              
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
A HEAVY PRICE FOR A DITCH 
 
 
“The Suez Crisis was a Greek tragedy, entirely of American making from start to 
finish.”1 
Sir William Jackson, British general and historian 
 
“Suez had many losers, and two clear victors – President Nasser and the Americans.”2 
Mohamed Heikal, Egyptian journalist and advisor to Gamal Abdel Nasser 
 
By 1956, the mandarins at the helm of an ever-shrinking empire viewed Egypt as 
a lost world.  Colored red on maps of British possessions around the globe since the 
nineteenth century, this former protectorate of the crown was red no longer.   Although 
with the overthrow of its pro-British king in 1952, Egypt had technically broken free 
from the sphere of influence of its former colonial overseer, lingering effects of empire 
remained; under the auspices of the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement of 1954 the United 
Kingdom’s presence persisted.  However, its light dimmed with the shadows cast by over 
80,000 British servicemen departing Egyptian soil.   This impressive army once occupied 
a base located on the Sinai Peninsula, near the Suez Canal at Ismailia.  Called “the 
greatest overseas military installation the world has ever known,” the base at Ismailia by 
early summer 1956 was manned by only a single battalion.3   This final squad had the 
distinct, but dubious, honor of being the last armed men to step foot from this former 
bastion of imperial power.  Their selection for this duty was not left to chance.  The 
regiment of grenadier guards was the direct descendent of the first battalion to land at 
                                                          
1 William Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire: A Military View (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1987), 145. 
2 Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes (New 
York: Arbor House, 1987),  201. 
3 Osgood Caruthers, "British Quietly Give Suez Base to Egypt After 74-Year 
Stay." New York Times, June 14, 1956. 1; Arthur Veysey, “Last of British Army in Egypt 
Leaves Quietly,” The Chicago Tribune, April 1, 1956, 2 
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Port Said during the Anglo-Egyptian War.4   In 1882, these soldiers helped to secure 
Egyptian obedience to the British Empire; now over seventy years later their posterities 
participated in its eradication.  There was no pomp or pageantry to mark the occasion of 
these last remnants of British authority leaving this ancient land; they quietly stole away 
in the middle of the night.  By dawn of June 13, 1956, it was highly debatable if Britannia 
still ruled the waves, but no longer a question that she had surrendered the ocean of desert 
sands covering the pharaohs’ former dominion.5  However, if the hopes of men 
occupying power in the corridors of White Hall were realized, not for long.6 
One Gamal Abdel Nasser held very different hopes.  Born into a working-class 
family during the waning months of World War I, Nasser joined the army at the age of 
nineteen.7  Rising quickly up the ranks in the Egyptian military, Nasser, in view of his 
contemporaries, was a man on the move.  Sixteen years later, at age 36, he became the de 
facto leader of his nation.8  For Nasser, it was only the start.  By 1956, the young 
Egyptian president had become a constant thorn in the side of British interests throughout 
the Middle East.  Since seizing power, Nasser sought to engender and export the spirits of 
anti-colonialism and pan-Arabism across the region.  By rejecting Western defense 
treaties, destabilizing pro-British regimes, and inflaming Arab masses, it was working.  
But in the summer of that year he hit a snag.  Starting in 1955, Nasser gambled much of 
his nation’s prestige on the construction of the Aswan Dam. Through this massive 
infrastructure project, he hoped to display the growing power of Egypt under his 
                                                          
4  Arthur Veysey, “Last of British Army in Egypt Leaves Quietly,” Chicago 
Tribune, April 1, 1956, 2. 
5 Osgood Caruthers, "British Quietly Give Suez Base to Egypt After 74-Year 
Stay," New York Times, June 14, 1956. 1. 
6 Remembering the initial phase of the Suez Crisis, prominent Conservative MP, 
Julian Amery, states, “Plainly the great issue has arisen.  I thought that withdrawal from 
the Canal Zone had been potentially fatal to the unity of the Commonwealth.  Was there 
not any opportunity to retrieve it?  I was convinced there was. And if we pressed an 
attack against Egypt, political if possible but military if necessary, we could recover the 
ground that had been lost.”  Quoted in Channel Four, End of Empire: Egypt (1985).  
7 Chester L. Cooper, The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956 (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1978), 54. 
8 Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 
55.  
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nationalist reign. 9  To fund this expensive endeavor significant sources of foreign 
investment were required.  Eager to gain Nasser as an ally against the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United States pledged to underwrite a hefty amount of the dam’s 
cost.  However, when Nasser sought to garner Soviet financial aid as well, the American 
government abruptly rescinded their offer.10  Left in a lurch, with the entire world 
watching, Nasser contemplated his next move.  On July 22, 1956, three days after the 
American action, a close friend of Nasser proposed gaining increased revenue for the 
Aswan Dam by renegotiating the fees of the usage of the Suez Canal with the British 
foreign minister.11  Nasser’s confidant argued that the British government might be 
convinced to up Egypt’s share of the canal’s revenue to 50 percent.  Nasser, never one to 
dream small, responded, “Why fifty-fifty, why not a hundred percent? Why is [that] too 
much?”12  The advisor did not have a response, but Anthony Eden certainly did. 
With the advent of the 1950s, the euphoria of victory over Imperial Japan and 
Nazi Germany had effectively worn off in the United States.  To the vast majority of 
Americans, the specter of a totalitarian menace still endangered the entire world.  The 
threat of international communism, embodied by the U.S.S.R, became an overriding 
factor affecting both the external diplomacy and domestic politics of the nation.   Locked 
into an increasingly complex global chess match with the Soviet Union, the foreign 
policy of the U.S. began to deviate more and more from those of its traditional allies of 
Britain and France.  Efficiently preventing the spread of communism became the litmus 
test of all American actions abroad.  In regards to Anglo-American relations, the key 
point of contention was not the succinct goal but the rudimentary means.  Britain, 
founded as an imperial power, viewed the continuation of her Empire -- albeit in a more 
benign and informal arrangement -- as an effective rampart against the spread of 
communist expansion.  In turn, the Americans saw it only as an antiquated albatross that 
actually increased the appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout the third world.  
                                                          
9  William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1985), 40. 
10 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the 
Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 47. 
11 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, xiv. 
12 Ibid.  
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The U.S. policymakers believed a third-way of nationalism (opposed to the binary choice 
of colonialism or communism) constituted the effective means of successfully halting 
Soviet influence around the globe.  In late 1955, these conflicting British and American 
ideas, gestating under the surface since the beginning of the Cold War, came to a head 
when the U.S. formally declined to join the Bagdad Pact.13  Officially known as the 
Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) and nominally led by Great Britain, the Pact 
was a collective security alliance formed to deter Soviet expansion into the near east.  
The Eisenhower administration initially supported its proposed formation 
enthusiastically.14  However, the U.S. soon soured on the idea after many in the Arab 
world began claiming that METO was only a cover for the continuation of Western 
imperial rule over its regional member nations.  METO’s fiercest critic was none other 
than Gamal Abdel Nasser.15   Fearful of offending Nasser and escalating anti-American 
sentiment in the region, the U.S., to the chagrin of its faithful British ally, refused to join 
the organization it had until recently actively promoted.  By the dawning of 1956, this 
perfidy of American support toward the U.K. still perplexed British leaders, although it 
really should not have.  The United States was neither pro-Britain nor pro-Egypt; it was 
solely first and foremost pro-America.16 
For eight days in the fall of 1956, these forces -- British, American, and Egyptian 
interests -- battled it out upon the public stage of international affairs with the rest of the 
world watching.  Although other nations were caught up in the conflict, the stakes stood 
highest for these three.  Egypt faced a return to de facto colonial rule, America the loss of 
goodwill in the developing world, and Great Britain the final demise of its empire.  When 
the smoke settled over the battlefields and the sound and fury ceased on the diplomatic 
scenes, the victors and vanquished were apparent to all.  In this transnational high-stakes 
poker game over the Suez Canal, Britannia came out flushed.  Her luck was up and the 
chips were gone.     
                                                          
13 Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 31. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Yaqub, 38. 
16 John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special 
Relationship, 1940-57 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 269. 
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After 1956, Suez symbolized more to the British citizenry than a location in 
Egypt.  In that year, it ignominiously fell into the category of words for localities that 
signified much, much more.   For the British people this was not a new concept.  
Throughout the early twentieth century, many others had been added to the lexicon of 
their collective conscious. The Somme, Gallipoli, Munich, Dunkirk, and Yalta all come 
to mind.  The mere mention of these points on a map engender images and concepts -- 
some virtuous, others shameful -- that leave little doubt that during a specific point of 
time the course of history had been redirected there, for good or ill.  In 1956, Suez 
became such a place.  One can find a fitting example of this transformation in the James 
Clavell novel Noble House (1981).  Set in the colony of Hong Kong during the 1960s, 
Clavell’s work focuses on a British expatriate attempting to fend off a hostile takeover of 
his investment bank by an American.  One character mentions “Suez “to a colleague and 
receives a visceral reaction.  “Oh! You mean the 1956 fiasco when Eisenhower betrayed 
us and caused the failure of the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt -- because Nasser 
had nationalized the canal?”17  Although the conversation is pure fiction, the sentiment, 
held in various forms on both sides of the Atlantic, and the accuracy of the facts are not 
far off the mark.18  While to term the refusal of Dwight Eisenhower to commit the United 
States into supporting the Suez expedition as a “betrayal” of the United Kingdom can be 
chalked up as hyperbolic rhetoric, the endeavor’s success nevertheless did hinge on that 
critical decision.  For ultimately the fate of Anthony Eden’s gambit would not be won or 
lost by bullets, tanks, and planes in the Egyptian desert but rested on world opinion, 
global financial markets, and geopolitics.  On these asymmetrical fields of battle, Eden 
                                                          
17 James Clavell, Noble House (New York: Delacorte Press, 1981), 191. 
18 Eisenhower’s own vice-president even became convinced this was true.  
Writing in his memoirs Richard Nixon states: “Eisenhower and Dulles put heavy public 
pressure on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their forces from Suez.  In retrospect I 
believe that our actions were a serious mistake.  Nasser became even more rash and 
aggressive than before, and the seeds of another Mideast war were planted.  The most 
tragic result was that Britain and France were so humiliated and discouraged by the Suez 
crisis that they lost the will to play a major role on the world scene.  From this time 
forward the United States would by necessity be forced to ‘go it alone’ in the foreign 
policy leadership of the free world.” Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard 
Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 179.    
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needed United States support.  It was essential, yet did not materialize.  Thus, the 
breakdown of Anglo-American diplomacy during the Suez Crisis resulted in the failure of 
the British government to achieve its primary aims of removing Egyptian President 
Nasser from power and reversing his nationalization of the Suez Canal.   
It should have been evident that American consent was essential for any 
intervention into Egypt by Great Britain and her allies to succeed.  Yet during the days 
and months leading up to the action, the United States consistently expressed its 
disapproval of a military solution for the Suez crisis.  However, the British disregarded 
these strident messages from the Eisenhower administration and instead chose to collude 
with France and Israel in ridding themselves of their collective nemesis -- Nasser.  
Shortly after this tacit agreement, on October 29, Israeli shock troops poured over the 
Egyptian border igniting the conflict.19  Two days later Britain joined the fray with RAF 
pilots raining fire down upon parts of Cairo.20  By the end of the first week of November, 
British and French forces had already partially seized control of the Suez Canal, while 
Israeli tanks raced across the Sinai Peninsula chasing remnants of the routed Egyptian 
army.  As military operations went, the joint British-French-Israeli assault could not have 
gone better.21  Resistance was minimal, timetables met, and casualties light; in the fog of 
war little more could be asked.  However, on November 6, without consulting either her 
French or Israeli allies, Britannia folded.  Or, more specifically, Anthony Eden declared a 
cease-fire to hostilities that would commence at midnight.22  An observer could question 
why, so close to victory but without any of its true objectives accomplished, the British 
government called it quits.  Although it was a bitter pill to swallow, the reason was 
obvious.  The next day Eden conceded the cruel truth: “It is clear we cannot now carry 
                                                          
19 Brian Lapping, End of Empire (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), 273. 
20 Geoffrey Carter, Crises Do Happen: The Royal Navy and Operation Musketeer, 
Suez 1956 (Lodge Hill, United Kingdom: Maritime, 2006), 27. 
21 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: Abacus 
History, 2012), 313. 
22 Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978), 
211. 
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this through alone with the French.  We must now get U.S. support.”23  Prior to this mea 
culpa realization by the U.K. prime minister, the Americans made it abundantly apparent 
that this “help” for its faithful ally would come at a steep price.  And if the British needed 
some reminding, the Eisenhower administration gave them some less than subtle hints.  
As the crisis unfolded the United States denounced Britain in the United Nations as an 
aggressor, harassed and threatened its naval forces, and most importantly withheld crucial 
financial support as the U.K teetered on the economic brink.24  The American price, in 
not so many words, was quite simple: the end of British intervention in Egypt.  In 
keeping with their famous stiff-upper-lip forbearance, the Brits paid in full. 
The repercussions of Suez were numerous and significant; they reverberated like 
earthquakes across the world.  Future events, like aftershocks, were shaped and molded 
by its occurrence.   Foremost of these was the ruin of Anthony Eden.  First went his 
physical health, shortly after his political premiership.  Although he had been plagued 
with bouts of illness since a botched gall-bladder operation in the early 1950s, during the 
duration of the crisis Eden’s wellbeing dramatically declined to such an extent that he 
was confined to bed by mid-November.  By early January 1957, in what many consider 
an American-supported palace coup orchestrated by members of his own party, he 
resigned as prime minister.25 Eden always defended his actions during Suez, stating 
                                                          
23 Scott W. Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US, and the Suez Crisis 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 295; Jonathan Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the 
Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 162.  
24 In regards to American financial pressure on Britain during the crisis, some 
historians hold a much more Machiavellian view of Eisenhower’s role.   David Watry 
argues: “During the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower secretly declared an all-out economic war 
against Great Britain.  He initiated a highly successful speculative financial attack on the 
value of sterling, which threatened to completely destabilize the British monetary system 
and economy. Herbert Hoover Jr., an expert at international finance, recommended the 
very arcane and elaborate strategy of the Federal Reserve quickly dumping their sterling 
holdings at basement prices, launching an attack on Britain’s currency.  Eisenhower 
played political and economic hardball to compel the British to withdraw from Suez.”  
David M. Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold 
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2014), 138.  
25 On American involvement, reporter Donald Neff writes, “Though the messages 
on the secret negotiations between Aldrich and the leadership of the Tory Party remain 
classified by the government. Transcripts of Eisenhower’s telephone conversations make 
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shortly after the crisis that he was “convinced, more convinced that I have been about 
anything in my public life, that we were right, my colleagues and I, in the judgments and 
decisions we took, and that history will prove it so.”26  He never wavered from this 
declaration.  However, as acclaimed historian Peter Hennessy succinctly puts it, “History 
has let Eden down.”27 In modern times Sir Anthony Eden is consistently regarded by both 
the British general public and academics as one of the “worst” prime ministers of the 
twentieth century.28  When reasons are inevitably cited for this dubious ranking, the word 
Suez both dominates and encapsulates that particular list.  
In contrasting fashion, Eden’s primary antagonist, Gamal Abdel Nasser, emerged 
from the crisis hailed as an Egyptian national hero and a champion against Western 
imperialism around the world.  His armies beaten on the battlefield, his nation invaded, 
and his capital bombed, Nasser nevertheless “won” the war.  Remaining as leader of 
Egypt until his death in 1970, he continued to plague his Suez adversaries throughout the 
Middle East during the 1960s.  His initiatives included aiding insurgents against British 
influence in Aden (Oman) and French governance in Algeria, while once again engaging 
in open conflict with Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War.  During the remainder of his 
rule, Nasser made it a point to settle the accounts of 1956. Although despised by the 
leadership of the other Arab states, with the notable exception of Syria, Nasser remained 
beloved by their masses until his death.  Today, even in the twenty-first century, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
it clear that the Conservative leaders and the Eisenhower Administration now began a 
secret collusion of their own.  Its purpose was to keep the Conservative government in 
power in Britain.  It amounted to a highly unethical meddling in Britain’s domestic 
affairs by Eisenhower.” Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into 
the Middle East (New York: Linden/Simon and Schuster, 1981), 425.     
26 Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Boston: Beacon, 1968), 222. 
27 Peter Hennessy, Having it so Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Penguin, 
2007), 406. 
28 Andrew Hough, “Gordon Brown 'Third Worst PM Since 1945', Poll of 
Historians Finds,” The Telegraph, August 3, 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/7923790/Gordon-Brown-third-worst-PM-since-
1945-poll-of-historians-finds.html (accessed August 18, 2015); “Thatcher and Attlee Top 
PM List,” BBC News, August 29, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5294024.stm (accessed August 18, 2015); 
“Churchill 'greatest PM of 20th Century,’” BBC News, January 4, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/575219.stm (accessed August 18, 2015).  
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countless denizens of the Near East celebrate him as a vanquisher of colonialism, fighter 
of Zionism, and father of Pan Arabism; with much of this sustained admiration coming 
from reverence for his perceived 1956 victory.  Myths, like perceptions, die -- if they ever 
truly do -- hard. 
For America the spoils/consequences of Suez was its continued presence in 
Middle Eastern affairs.  After the crisis, as the British lion stumbled off to lick its 
wounds, it fell to the United States to take up the mantle for Western interests in the 
region.  This fomented a role that is yet to be relinquished.  In the afterglow of the British 
humiliation over Egypt, goodwill toward the Eisenhower Administration abounded 
throughout the Arab world.  Pro-American sentiment filled the streets, and praise 
reverberated toward the U.S. president who was exalted for his “principles” and his 
“noble attitude in support of right and justice.”29  In no uncertain terms this euphoria 
came from only one specific exploit: the United States’ role in halting British and Israeli 
aims during Suez.     For the applause turned out to be ephemeral; less than a year later 
things began to sour.  Nine months after Suez, unrest in Syria brought threats of 
American intervention, then by 1958 over 10,000 U.S. soldiers waded into the morass of 
a chaotic Lebanese civil war.30  By these actions -- and numerous more to follow -- many 
in the Arab world came to believe that the United States had simply replaced a waning 
Britannia as their would be colonial master; in coming years chants of “death to 
America” and burning “Old Glory” became ubiquitous on street corners dotting the Arab 
world.31  While Eisenhower’s actions at Suez, taking America into the heart of Middle 
Eastern concerns, are now over sixty years old, the repercussions of those decisions still 
linger.  
                                                          
29 Yaqub, 65. 
30 Dana Adam Schmidt, "Eisenhower says Soviet Objective is to Rule Syria,” 
New York Times, August 22, 1957, 1; W. H. Lawrence, "U.S. Reinforcements Arrive in 
Lebanon," New York Times, August 2, 1958, 1. 
31 This interpretation of Arab fury over American foreign policy supports Edward 
Said’s arguments on the subject, laid out in his work Orientalism (1979), as opposed to 
the ones contended by his academic rival, Bernard Lewis, that are prominently featured 
in Lewis’ 1990 Atlantic Monthly article “Roots of Muslim Rage.”  See Edward W. Said, 
Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim 
Rage," The Atlantic, September 1990, 17-26. 
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Many Anglophiles might find it as tempting now, as many Britons did in the late 
1950s, to compartmentalize the failure of the Suez expedition into a personal one of 
Anthony Eden’s own creation.  The harsh truth is, although Eden’s fate might perfectly 
personify the results of the crisis, Suez left an indelible black mark on Great Britain’s 
reputation as a global force, which no amount of whitewashing ever removed.  Two 
dominant, but competing, schools of thought in British history both interpret the failed 
1956 invasion of Egypt as the death knell for the empire and a turning point of the 
nation.32  The first, as Dominic Sandbrook asserts, views this watershed moment as 
forming a signpost highlighting the declining fortunes of the country.  “The symbolic 
importance of the crisis,” he declares, “was that it marked a confrontation between the 
old ambitions of British imperialism and the new realities of post imperial retrenchment. 
Indeed, the Suez affair illustrated with striking clarity the decline of British imperial 
power.”33  He goes on to write, “It was not, as some people tend to imagine, a cause of 
that decline; rather, it was a reflection of Britain’s changed role in the world, partly as a 
result of two ruinously expensive global wars.”34  He closes with, “In fact, British 
imperial power had been ebbing for decades.  Suez simply demonstrated it, powerfully 
and incontrovertibly, to the entire world.”35 In essence, Sandbrook and other historians of 
this inclination maintain that Suez pulled back the curtain shrouding the British Empire 
thereby exposing its failing nature for all to see.   
                                                          
32 A third, but not widely-held reading of the post-World War II British Empire 
postulates Suez was merely a momentary hindrance towards the deliberate transformation 
of the United Kingdom’s global influence from hard to soft power.  This theory holds 
Suez was in large part simply a personal failure for Eden alone.  As professor Benjamin 
Grob-Fitzgibbon explains: “From 1948 to the mid-1960s, the British government did not 
abandon its imperial mission.  Rather it reshaped that mission to better facilitate the 
conditions of the postwar world.  Correctly recognizing that the age of national self-
determination and self-government was upon it, and cognizant of the bipolarity of the 
Cold War environment, the government evolved its strategy to preference the devolution 
of power to indigenous peoples over the autocratic practice of that power.” Benjamin 
Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 376. 
33 Dominic Sandbrook, Never Had It so Good: A History of Britain from Suez to 
the Beatles (London: Abacus, 2005), 27. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.  
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The second theory holds that the crisis itself is, in fact, the catalyst that brought 
Britain as a world power to its knees.  Although not an adherent of this model, Niall 
Ferguson makes the very real point that the fiasco at Suez “sent a signal to nationalists 
throughout the British Empire: the hour of freedom had struck.  But the hour was chosen 
by the Americans, not by the nationalists.”36  Sir William Jackson argues that before 
Suez, “Britain’s attempt to rebuild her post-war position in the world using the idiom of 
the Commonwealth rather than Empire seemed to be succeeding.”37  He goes on to make 
clear that through failing to meet her objectives during Suez, Britannia had no choice but 
to, “abandon her attempt to regain superpower status in the post-war world and begin the 
final phases of her withdrawal from Empire.”38 Finally, while these two schools of 
British historical thought might differ on the actual meaning of the Suez affair, both agree 
that its ultimate result upon the United Kingdom remains the same; namely, that the 
nation was left in a much weaker position in its foreign affairs -- and in the world at-large 
-- after the crisis than before it. 
To comprehend clearly the American and British choices resulting in the Suez 
affair much groundwork is required.  These fateful decisions, conceived not in a timeless 
vacuum, are the accumulation of a long and curious history of Anglo-American relations.  
By examining this connection, especially during the post-World War II era of the “special 
relationship,” the rationale directing the leadership in these nations, during the fall of 
1956, starts to crystalize.  While context does not fully explain the diplomatic breakdown 
between the two allies, it is essential in paving the way for a balanced explanation.  This 
trip down memory lane illustrates that the rift between the U.S. and the U.K. over British 
objectives during Suez should not have come as much of a surprise as it did to the 
Conservative government of Anthony Eden.  
Also required in fully grasping the failure of British policy during Suez is an 
understanding of what Eden sought to achieve through his thinly veiled invasion of 
Egypt.  Here, again, significant context is required.  Great Britain’s involvement in the 
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domestic affairs of Egypt antedated Suez by over eighty years.  During this long and 
contentious association, violence dotted Anglo-Egyptian relations, sowing the rancorous 
seeds that eventually blossomed into open warfare between the two parties by 1956.  
Likewise, another key to understanding this turn of events is the personal relationship 
between Anthony Eden and Gamal Abdel Nasser.  For their actions more than any others 
brought the crisis to fruition.  By examining these two facets of the past, British goals 
during Suez, of removing Nasser from power and reclaiming the Suez Canal, become 
manifest. 
Finally, the mere recounting of the Suez affair -- from Nasser’s July 26 
nationalization of the canal to the final withdrawal of British forces on December 22 -- 
demonstrates that the Eisenhower Administration sought a very different path to 
resolving the crisis than did the British government.  And this disagreement between the 
United States and Britain over Suez is what wrought failure and humiliation upon 
Anthony Eden and his nation. Through the narrating of events over this six-month period, 
Eden’s fateful choice to misread, mitigate, and ultimately disregard American objections 
to a military solution in response to Nasser’s action becomes obvious.  Although the time 
period is short, much transpired in these days and nights that made lasting history.  
Unpacking these events is simple, but not easy.  However, no squabbles over definitions 
of words, no existential interpretations of occurrences, and no high drawn-out 
metaphysical search for hidden agency will be necessary here.  Simply put this is a tale 
that requires no equivocation. 
In 1855, Ferdinand de Lesseps traveled to London to meet with members of the 
British government.  This French diplomat and visionary needed financial investors for 
an independent company to pursue his dream of transfiguring ocean travel.  De Lesseps 
approached Lord Palmerston, then prime minister, with an audacious plan to carve out a 
canal from the desert sands covering the Sinai Peninsula.39  When reviewing de Lesseps’ 
proposal the British government declared that he was asking for “a heavy price for a 
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ditch.”40  He went home empty handed, but future British leaders would rue this 
shortsighted mistake made by their predecessor.  For after its completion, the incalculable 
benefit of the Suez Canal became apparent to all. Even to the most obstinate Englishman.  
In essence, this new waterway had made the world smaller.  A little over a hundred years 
later, the name “Ferdinand de Lesseps” and the ownership of that “ditch” would again 
come to infuriate a British.  On July 26 1956, during a radio address ostensibly decrying 
Western colonialism, Nasser repeated the Frenchman’s name over fourteen times.41  It 
was pointless overkill. The Egyptian troops, waiting for that specific code word, started 
storming the offices of the Anglo-Franco controlled Suez Company after its initial 
utterance. Thus began the Suez Crisis, which ultimately cost the British Empire more 
than it ever bargained for over that particular ditch.  Ironically, this heavy price is due, in 
large part, to the actions of one of its former colonies and its closest allies – the United 
States.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
GREEKS IN AN AGE OF ROMANS 
 
 
“We have to maintain our position as an Empire and a Commonwealth.  If we fail to do 
so we cannot exist as a world power.”42 
-Anthony Eden, 1942 
 
“One thing we are sure we are not fighting for is to hold the British Empire together.  We 
don’t like to put the matter so bluntly, but we don’t want you to have any illusions. If 
your strategists are planning a war to hold the British Empire together they will sooner or 
later find themselves strategizing alone.”43 
-From an open letter to the people of England by the editors of Life magazine, October 
1942 
 
As the old adage goes, when the chips are truly down, families -- even extended 
ones -- stick together.  Such was the case upon the faraway waters of the Pei-ho River in 
China on June 25, 1859.  During the Second Anglo-Chinese War, an attachment of Royal 
Navy gunboats assaulting the Taku Forts, which guarded the strategic tributary, literally 
found themselves in dire straits.  Quickly pinned down by preternaturally accurate 
artillery fire from these Chinese fortifications, the ensnared forces suffered heavy 
casualties and faced utter annihilation.44  In the midst of this chaos, a second barge of 
armed vessels wrecklessly entered the fray.  These newly arrived gunboats of the United 
States Navy, commanded by Commodore Josiah Tattnall, began rescuing British sailors 
while also joining in their fight against the Chinese.45  The episode marked the first time 
American and British troops fought, not as adversaries, but as brothers in arms.  By 
disobeying strict orders to maintain U.S. neutrality, the Commodore became, on both 
sides of the Atlantic, an immediate folk hero for his perceived gallant action.  He 
garnered even more acclaim with his response to superiors who demanded an explanation 
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for why he violated a direct command not to get involved in the conflict.  Tattnall’s 
simple justification has never left the English-language lexicon. He plainly wrote, “Blood 
is thicker than water.”46   
During the tumultuous days of November 1956, Anthony Eden banked his 
nation’s fortunes on the conviction that Dwight Eisenhower would make the same 
magnanimous decision that Commodore Tattnall did a century earlier.  Casting aside all 
his anti-colonial sentiments, discounting the counsel of his Anglophobic advisors, and 
screwing his courage to the sticking place, the American president would ultimately do 
the “honorable” thing.  Any cursory glance at the communal history of American and 
Britain relationships of the early 20th century could reasonably give one such hope.  For 
is it not true that through the flames of two world wars and the emergence of a new 
colder one, they had alway stood rigidly together?  Steadfast in the defense of democracy, 
liberty, and decency, these international powers would support their English-speaking 
counterpart.   However, this supposition of the British prime minister, also held by many 
others, was constructed on a false and romanticized narrative.    
Suez stands as a testament to a harsh and fundamental truth: self-interest, not 
sentimental bonds of brotherhood, forge the fires that fuel international relations.  
Although noble and altruistic actions did and do occur between nations, they are sadly the 
exceptions to this axiom.   The Anglo-American relationship, considered from the dawn 
of the twentieth century until 1955, holds fewer of these magnanimous allowances than a 
casual observer might reasonably expect.  In fact, if past interactions by these two nations 
were indicative of future exchanges, the American obstruction of British aims during the 
Suez Crisis seems quite predictable.  To say the least, from the perspective of Great 
Britain’s policymakers in the waning months of 1956 -- notably one Anthony Eden -- it 
was anything but.  As lessons go, it proved a harsh and unrelenting one.  This necessary 
revisionist lesson of Anglo-American diplomacy, foreshadowing and contributing to 
decisions made at Suez, divides nicely into two unique chronicles.  As with so many 
other attempts at periodization, here a war’s bloody conclusion works suitably to separate 
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the shepherding narratives.  The first, 1890s until the end of World War II, lays the 
foundation of the myth Eden found so falsely reassuring; the second, from 1945 until 
Suez, exposes the widening cracks -- which British policymakers should have found 
evident -- between the two English-speaking allies that left Great Britain’s national 
stature tumbling into a sinking abyss during November 1956. 
Long before Winston Churchill ever uttered the term “Special Relationship” on a 
tiny college campus in the spring of 1946, there first came the Great Rapprochement.  
During much of the 19th century, the exploits of an American commodore on a river in 
China notwithstanding, dealings between the two Atlantic powers were fraught with 
tension.  Marked by numerous international incidents since open hostilities formally 
ended with the cessation of the War of 1812, the former colony and its mother country 
stayed on shaky ground, diplomatically speaking.  Through a succession of uneasy and 
taut engagements, this frosty relationship looked to spark into fiery conflict on more than 
one occasion.  The most notable of these episodes were the Caroline Affair (1837), the 
grossly misnamed Aroostook War (1839), the Oregon Question (1848), the Trent Affair 
(1861), the Fenian Raids (1866 and 1871), and the  Venezuelan Crisis (1895).47  The list 
goes on; yet, these above-named crises stand out due to the fact war between the United 
States and Great Britain stood as a real, feasible, and at times likely outcome each.  
Laying general blame solely on one side for these potential casus belli is difficult. 
However, a number of historians make the case that an arriviste America could fit the bill 
as the provocateur in most cases.48  By 1895, open combat would finally settle hostile 
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tensions between the two nations; although it was another aged empire, thankfully not 
Britain, which the American eagle furiously lashed it talons out at that brought about the 
accommodation.   
One telling encounter during the Spanish-American War cannot roughly illustrate 
or explain fifty years of Anglo-American cooperation, but it is a good start.  When the 
U.S. went to war with Spain in 1898, primarily over Cuba, European solidarity for the 
Spanish cause stood universal except in Albion.49  Although technically neutral, Britannia 
made her pro-American sympathies perfectly clear: “within hours of the news that the 
United States had declared war thousands of red, white, and blue streamers decked 
buildings in London and the British press came out enthusiastically on the American 
side.”50  Here, with the fervent flag waving by Englanders for their Atlantic cousins, 
many chroniclers attest the Great Rapprochement began; yet its true formation, from a 
strategic sense, took place thousands of miles away at a contested harbor on the Pacific 
Ocean.   
For even after his one-sided victory over the Spanish on May 1, 1898, George 
Dewey’s dominance over Manila Bay remained contested.51   By June of that year, events 
found him facing down another potential hostile fleet.52  Sailing into the harbor were 
three men-of-war battleships of the German East Asia squadron, with their commanding 
officer bellowing to a worried Dewey that, “I am here by order of the Kaiser, Sir!”53 This 
troublesome development seemed to confirm rumors that Germany sought to add the 
Philippines onto its increasing list of recent colonial possessions. Dewey, taking the 
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threat seriously, declared to a German Flag-Lieutenant, “If Germany wants war, all right, 
we are ready.”54  As both sides positioned their fleets for a prospective battle, the ships of 
other foreign nations wisely sailed out of range.  All except the British contingent, who 
situated themselves squarely alongside the Americans, guns ready.  On August 14, the 
outnumbered German ships peacefully left the harbor and sailed on their way, easing the 
rising tensions between the three nations.55  In both the U.S. and the U.K., the press 
celebrated their nations’ collective success in stymieing the efforts of an aggressive 
power.56  Through this little-known episode of collaboration between two homogeneous 
groups against a threatening, “other” comes the direct basis of the Anglo-American 
cooperation that existed until the end of 1945.   
German militarism, early Russian Bolshevism, Japanese imperialism, and Nazi 
fascism made the U.S. and Britain easy international allies when circumstances 
demanded.   Combined with Otto Von Bismarck’s insightful observation of both nations 
speaking a common language, other factors contributed to this “natural” alliance when 
facing global and regional dangers to their shared interests.  A common heritage focusing 
on democratic values, mutually beneficial trade and commerce, and power structures in 
both countries based around similar WASP elites aided as well.  The advent of more 
modern technology quickening potential military threats from hostile powers, rising 
nationalist fervor in Europe and Asia, and an increased desire to safeguard international 
trade gave policymakers, on both sides of the Atlantic, caused to parlay these similarities 
into an informal alliance of their respective nations on various occasions.  However, only 
when both Americans and Britons found it advantageous to their distinct goal(s) did this 
bonding of Anglo-American unity take place.  Furthermore, even when the two nations 
did agree upon reasons for a casus foederis (case for alliance) disagreements still arose 
plaguing the diplomatic connections of the two powers.  Though others exist, the major 
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case in point of this trend of complex interactions between the United States and Great 
Britain is their resulting relationship after the First World War.   
Although speaking about a different situation in an earlier century, Lord 
Palmerston’s telling remark about nations having only permanent interests and not 
permanent allies could easily sum up the Anglo-American relationship after World War I.  
Arising again in 1917, as it did in Manila Bay during the summer of 1898, unwise foreign 
policy initiatives by Kaiser Wilhelm II resulted in American-British cooperation against 
the German military.  On April 2, antagonized by the reveal of the now infamous 
Zimmerman telegram and by the desperate decision of the German navy to conduct 
unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic, the United States joined the Franco-
British efforts against the Kaiser’s Empire.57  Soon afterwards, and not for the last time in 
the twentieth century, forces from the New World belatedly marshaled over the sea to 
save the Old.  With victory achieved against the Central Powers by November 1918, the 
Anglo-American bond -- generated through their collective wartime struggle against a 
common enemy -- evaporated like the mid-morning mist.  Fundamental disputes arose 
between the two allies that, “exacerbated tensions in their economic dealings; brought 
into question the reliability of the USA as a long-term friend; posed difficult questions 
about the future world order [and] brought Anglo-American naval rivalry into sharper 
focus.”58   Adding to these divisions one must include disagreements over war 
reparations, loan repayments, collective security arrangements, and finally Woodrow 
Wilson’s attempt to remake the world in America’s image through the implementation of 
his Fourteen Points.59  For these numerous reasons by the 1920s, with the specter of a 
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joint international menace long vanished, images of Uncle Sam and Britannia walking 
with arms interlocked faded into memory.  See Figure One.  
 
 
Figure 1: Poster with artwork by famed American illustrator James Montgomery 
Flagg.  Created by American Lithographic Co. N.Y. in 1918. 
Source: Uncle Sam with Britannia. Digital image. Son of the South. Accessed 
April 9, 2016. www.sonofthesouth.net. 
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Replacing this imagery was military leaders occupying smoke-filled offices 
located in London and Washington dusting off and updating contingency plans for 
possible war between the two nations.60  Although the chance of armed conflict between 
the United States and the United Kingdom never stood as a realistic likelihood during 
these inter-war years, it remained a  possibility.61  As Winston Churchill adroitly 
pronounced in 1927, while it was, “quite right in the interest of peace to go on talking 
about war with the United States being ‘unthinkable,’ everyone knows this is not true.”62  
Thankfully, in the mid-to-late-1930s, these tensions in the English-speaking world 
abated; differing political and economic circumstances pointed American and British 
politicians’ focus in opposing -- yet not antagonistic -- directions.  Mired in the 
seemingly everlasting financial downturn of the Great Depression, Roosevelt’s 
administration concentrated its efforts inward, concerned chiefly with improving the 
nation’s domestic situation.63  Dissimilarity, the curious and ominous actions of a failed 
Austrian artist turned German dictator increasingly held the rapt attention of public 
officials at Westminster. However, by the early fall of 1939, regardless of wanted 
inclinations by British and American leaders, neither the White House nor Downing 
Street could help but watch Europe igniting with the first sparks of war.  
Arising to the forefront on the stage of history during this dark hour for humanity 
strode Anthony Eden.  Serving as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the 
governments of both Stanley Baldwin and his successor Neville Chamberlain, Eden, 
earlier than most, foresaw the menacing presence that a Germany ruled by Adolf Hitler 
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offered the world.64  Unlike numerous of his compatriots and many members of his own 
Conservative party, he refused to see the Third Reich as a lesser evil than the Soviet 
Union, or agree that German Nazism stood as an acceptable counterbalance to Russian 
Bolshevism.  Resigning his cabinet position in 1938 over Chamberlain’s appeasement 
policies, events soon vindicated Eden’s earlier warnings when Winton Churchill 
reappointed Eden to his old post of Foreign Secretary in 1940.65  While Eden’s strong 
sentiments against appeasing dictators would directly contribute to his thoughts and 
actions during the Suez Crisis sixteen years later, a telling moment during these earlier 
war years seemed to escape his memory in November 1956.  For although Eden was as 
an active participant during the events of World War II, it must be recognized he also 
stood in the forefront as a first-hand observer.   
The dawning of May 13, 1940 saw France quickly collapsing before the Nazis 
war machine and with it a likely invasion of England looming.66  Nevertheless, on that 
date at a meeting of the War Cabinet, Winston Churchill imparted a blood oath roundly 
embraced by the British citizenry and their dominion kinsmen to fight to the death against 
the seemingly unstoppable forces of Hitler’s Germany. “If this long island story of ours is 
to end at last,” Churchill defiantly maintained, “let it end only when each one of us lies 
choking in his own blood upon the grounds.”67 The horrible prospect of utter defeat for 
the United Kingdom never stood as a starker and real probability than during the months 
of that followed that poetic utterance; the crisis over Suez hardly ranks in the same 
category.  Faced with the possibilities of subjugation and national annihilation the British 
Isles remained alone in its most critical time of need, aided only by its loyal Empire.  
With the United States unwilling to rush urgently to safeguard Britain’s very survival 
during this calamitous timespan, it is hard to believe any observer -- Anthony Eden 
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included most of all -- should have expected American support during the Suez Crisis as 
a foregone conclusion.  
Only with a direct Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, accompanied by Hitler’s 
foolhardy declaration of war on the United States three days later, did America finally 
join Britain’s deadly struggle against the Axis powers.68  United again as allies in the 
fight against common enemies, the U.S. and U.K. had more than sufficient reasons to put 
away past disagreements; but they did not.  The British concept and practice of empire 
lay at the center of an ongoing dispute  between the two English-speaking powers.  
Starting with FDR’s thrusting of the Atlantic Charter upon Churchill in August 1941, 
Roosevelt and his administration seized every opportunity to decry and criticize the 
British maintenance of their colonial possessions.69   
Harkening back to sentiments expressed at its inception, the United States never 
viewed the Britons’ custom of acquiring and maintaining imperial holdings in high regard 
or even as moral.  This disdain only strengthened in the early twentieth century with 
Woodrow Wilson’s quixotic crusade to make the world “safe for democracy” and to 
promote self-determination of peoples around the globe -- philosophies most Americans 
found antithetical to the concept of empire.  However, unlike during the Great War when 
British and American economic and military strengths were more equipotential, during 
World War II the United States as the more dominant power pressured its now-unequal 
confederate to cede to its demands.  Ruffling major feathers on the part of the British 
leadership, this American criticism of internal policies of the United Kingdom came as an 
unwelcome corollary to critical military and financial aid the U.S. provided to the 
ongoing war effort.70  Churchill and Eden maintained the continued possession of the 
Empire and the status of Great Britain as a world power were nonnegotiable in a postwar 
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world -- no matter how their closest ally viewed things.71  Strongly reiterating this 
opinion near the end of the war on New Year’s Eve 1944, Churchill wrote:   
There must be no question of our being hustled or seduced into declarations 
affecting British sovereignty in any of the Dominions or Colonies.  Pray 
remember my declaration against liquidating the British Empire.  If the 
Americans want to take Japanese islands which they have conquered, let them do 
so with our blessing and any form of words that may be agreeable to them.  But 
‘Hands off the British Empire’ is our maxim and it must not be weakened or 
smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue.72   
 
Other voices of a more malleable -- and perchance realistic -- tone did exist regarding the 
increasingly transforming Anglo-American relationship during the war.   
These forward-thinking English adherents held the question:  if the United States 
could aggressively persuade the liquidation of the British Empire as still undetermined; 
however, they maintained that ascendency of the United States over the United Kingdom 
on the international scene a fait accompli.   In 1943, Harold Macmillan, a rising star in 
the Conservative Party who later played a critical and curious role during the Suez Crisis, 
articulated this view wonderfully by way of devising a historical allegory.  Speaking of 
the British upon their status in assessing the ascension of American power and influence, 
Macmillan declared, “We are the Greeks in the New Roman Empire.”73  In this 
comparison, as historian John Charmley explains, America as the New Romans “had the 
military prowess and the treasure with which to rule, but they were, so the stereotype had 
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it, rather brainless and therefore in need of guidance from the subtle and better-educated 
Greeks.”74  This theory, eloquently condensed by Macmillan, left hope that with the war 
winding down the British role in the forming Western alliance and evolving “special 
relationship”  would not have to be one of total subservience to their American partner.  
As events from the ending of World War II until Suez shows in many aspects this model 
-- even if its justification is far-fetched -- of an autonomous Britain under the shadow of a 
hegemonic America proved to a certain extent to be correct.      
 There is no denying that from the dawning of the Great Rapprochement until the 
many jubilant celebrations over V-J Day, the United States and Great Britain made 
competent and willing allies on several occasions.   When individual concerns coincided, 
both countries put aside their disagreements and agreed to combat a threating “other.”  
While idealists on both sides of the Atlantic interpreted this mutual cooperation as signs 
of some mythical eternal bond of friendship, it simply boiled down to plain naked self-
interest dressed up in the flashy, but cheap, garbs of a false Anglo-Saxon commonality.  
For the British to gamble strategic operations, such as the invasion of Egypt in 1956, 
upon the reliance of altruistic U.S. support grounded in the history of Anglo-American 
relations stood oddly counterintuitive.  During the first forty-five years of the twentieth 
century, only when Americans found it directly beneficial to themselves did they ever 
rush to aid their struggling “cousins.”  Even with the breakdown of the Grand Soviet-
Anglo-American Alliance over Stalin’s expansionist foreign policies, this trait of the U.S. 
still refused to be reverse entirely.  At the end of World War II, with the community of 
nations already choosing sides between the communist East or the capitalist West, the 
United States continued to leave their “special” ally to fend for themselves more times 
than not.   By the 1950s, policymakers of Britain -- in turn -- reciprocated by creating 
wrinkles of their own to the Anglo-American relationship.   
 Although Winston Churchill began employing the term “special relationship” 
shortly after the Americans joined the war effort in the early 1940s, it did not gain 
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prominence until his usage of it in his “Sinews of Peace” address on March 5, 1946.75  By 
this time, with Cold War tensions heating up, the cooling off of Anglo-American 
cooperation was well underway.  Starting even before the official end of the Second 
World War, the British public gave their American counterparts a shock.  In the summer 
of 1945, they voted out their beloved war-time leader and selected in his place a 
socialist.76  Perplexed by Clement Attlee’s electoral victory over the half-American 
Churchill, one U.S. politician proclaimed this move by the British public, “a very long 
step toward communism.”77  Swift to alleviate such fears in the United States, Attlee 
announced his government as strongly anti-communist and declared Britain’s 
commitment to the Atlantic alliance intact.78  Nevertheless, substantial disagreements 
with America plagued his premiership.  
Conflicts of an economic and diplomatic nature soon arose between the Attlee 
Government and the Truman Administration.  On the day after V-J Day, the American 
government abruptly halted the lead-lease program, which had then become a sustaining 
lifeline to the British economy.  Faced with an “economic Waterloo,” Attlee sent famed 
economist John Maynard Keynes to Washington hoping to negotiate funds for his now 
nearly bankrupt nation from its much wealthier ally.  Keynes, confident that he could 
convince his American counterparts to gift much of the needed capital, considered that 
such an allotment of funds a fitting reward for the suffering the British endured while 
America refused to join into the war effort until late 1941.  The U.S. representatives 
thought otherwise.79  When the terms and conditions of the 1946 Anglo-American loan 
agreement were finalized, no altruistic gifts, or as Keynes had also put it “justice,” for the 
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British people laid included in its text.80  As an English reporter smartly summarized for 
the British, “It is aggravating to find that our reward for losing a quarter of our national 
wealth in the common cause is to pay tribute for half a century to those who have been 
enriched by war.”81  Quickly coming on the heels of this humiliating loan arrangement 
was news of the passage into law by the American government of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946 -- or as commonly titled the McMahon Act.  Disregarding vital contributions by 
British scientists to the Manhattan Project along with an earlier pledge by the U.S. to 
share the discovery of atomic bomb with the United Kingdom, the McMahon Act forbid 
imparting of nuclear secrets to any foreign power. 82  In defiance of the U.S. wishes to 
halt nuclear proliferation, Britannia forged her own path.  Fearful that an anti-colonial 
America would not defend its overseas possessions against a threatening atomic power 
(namely, the Soviet Union), the British government sought its own nuclear deterrent.  
Attlee’s Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, stated after reviewing the potential power of the 
atomic bomb, “We've got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs . . . . We've got to 
have the bloody Union Jack on top of it.”83  To the chagrin of many in America, British 
scientists granted Bevin his wish with the success of Operation Hurricane, the initial 
successful testing of a nuclear device by the U.K., on October 3, 1952.84   
Although these discernible differences caused relations to deteriorate between the 
two nations, Cold War pressures held the fundamental alliance together during these 
early years of the special relationship.  Marked with the perceived encroachment of the 
Soviet Union upon Western spheres of interest in Europe and the Middle East, the United 
States maintained a firm internationalist bent to its foreign policy.  It did not retreat to the 
safety of its own hemisphere, as it had after World War I, but instead spearheaded a 
multinational coalition against communist expansion.  Yet, this coalition made obvious 
the increasingly subservient place the United Kingdom now held in this alliance.  
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Stretched to its limit by financial confines and logistical commitments of its continuing 
Empire, by 1946 Great Britain found itself unable to adequately support Greece’s 
friendly government against communist insurgents or protect Turkey from unwarranted 
Soviet influence.85  Forced to withdraw troops and funds from the conflict in Greece, 
Bevin quickly fired off a telegram to his American counterpart pleading with him to fill 
the void of the extracting British support.86  Recognizing the need to curb further Soviet 
expansion, Secretary of State Dean Acheson swiftly agreed America needed to 
supplement and continue economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece, which could 
no longer be provided by its English ally.  Although this commitment by the United 
States to replace and expand Western assistance to countries facing communist insurgents 
-- commonly known as the Truman Doctrine -- secured the U.S. and the U.K. as partners 
against the Soviet Union, and it also revealed the true pecking order of that union in the 
eyes of the United States.  As Acheson decried, this episode showed to America that as a 
world power, “the British are finished. They are through.”87                         
By the return of Winston Churchill to the premiership in 1951, Britain found itself 
fighting a two-front war.  Numerous observers in London saw both flanks as uphill 
battles. Mired with anti-colonial sentiments in many parts of the Empire, guerrilla 
warfare dotted the decreasingly red-colored charts of British colonies while maps 
denoting Asia and Europe turned increasingly red of a different shade.  To the vexation of 
the newly reelected Churchill, large chunks of the British Empire he once governed were 
now bygone memories.  Under amplified pressure from the Truman Administration, 
Attlee had allowed India and Palestine to slip from English rule.88  Adding to Churchill’s 
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frustration came the perceived failure of the West to sufficiently heed his warning of the 
encroaching threat of international Marxism. Pressed to the limits by its decreased global 
influence and ability to project national power, the British Empire needed to make a 
choice.  Unable to commit to both fighting internal dangers to its colonial holdings while 
rigorously combating every external communist threat around the globe, Britain, under 
the leadership of Churchill, decided to salvage the enduring remnants of British imperial 
power.  Concentrating upon fighting pitched holding actions in Kenya, Malaysia, and 
Egypt, the United Kingdom left the wider geopolitical conflict of the Cold War squarely 
on the shoulders of the United States.  This British course of action set an unruly wave of 
displeasure between the Atlantic powers. 
By the inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower as the thirty-fourth American 
president, the Cold War had turned increasingly hot.  While fighting side by side in a 
stalemated Korea, the governments of the United States and Great Britain found 
themselves increasingly at odds on maintaining a united Anglo-American foreign policy 
in regards to the rest of the world.  As historian Daniel Williamson argues, the primary 
reason for this disunion was that “Britain did not place its own [foreign] policies, 
designed to defend its status as a global power, in subordination to the American plans 
for containing Communism.”89  When forced to choose between stalwartly promoting an 
anti-communism agenda or protecting its Empire, Britain always chose empire.90  
Williamson clearly agrees with this assessment: “The principal goal of Britain’s foreign 
policy was to stop the erosion of its power.  America’s overwhelming concern was to 
stop the expansion of Communism.”91 China stands as the perfect hallmark of these 
diverging policies.  With the failure of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 to hold mainland China, 
communist domination of a third of the globe became a reality.92  American politicians of 
both liberal and conservative stripes reeled at this event.  This “fall of China” contributed 
                                                          
89 Daniel C. Williamson, Separate Agendas: Churchill, Eisenhower, and Anglo-
American Relations, 1953-1955 (New York: Lexington Books, 2006), 8. 
90 Mallory Browne, "Britain Bases Foreign Policy on Her Empire,” New York 
Times, February 24, 1946, 69. 
91 Williamson, 8 
92 “Chiang’s Exit Ends Rule of 22 Years," New York Times, January 22, 1949. 2. 
30 
 
significantly to the rise of a second Red Scare in the United States and the advent of 
McCarthyism.  Yet in America’s closest ally, the mood was far less apocalyptic.   
To preserve its colony of Hong Kong from Red Chinese aggression, Great Britain 
eagerly sought to establish cordial diplomatic relations with Mao Zedong’s new 
government.93  In 1950, to the profound irritation of the American government, Britannia 
recognized the People’s Republic of China and withdrew her recognition of the 
Nationalist regime on Taiwan.94  Then in 1954-55, during what would be termed the First 
Offshore Crisis, the U.K. refused, over intense American pressure, to support Taiwan 
against aggressions from the mainland communist government.95  U.S. frustrations at the 
refusal of Great Britain to follow its lead during this time also brought clashes over 
another Asia nation.96  In 1954, with French colonial forces making a desperate final 
stand at Dien Bien Phu, the United States longed to aid its French ally in Indochina.  
Although a committed anti-colonial, Eisenhower and his administration sought frantically 
to deny a victory in Vietnam to the communist insurgents led by Ho Chi Minh.  In the 
waning days of the war, the Americans proposed to the British a joint action to save the 
beleaguered French forces.  Titled Operation Vulture, it entailed the usage of massive 
American air power to lift the siege of Dien Bien Phu.97  Although Eisenhower requested 
only token British forces to foster an appearance of bilateral action, Churchill and Eden -- 
believing the French fight to hold Vietnam a lost cause -- declined to commit any aircraft 
to the effort.  Without British support, Eisenhower refused to green light the operation, 
leaving the encircled French army to surrender on May 7.98   
Only when faced with naked communist aggression, such as in Korea, did Britain 
ever enthusiastically join the American anti-communist crusade during the late 1940s to 
the mid-1950s.  Contrary to Macmillan’s airy metaphor of post-war Anglo-American 
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relations, the British-Greeks held their own against the American-Romans when the issue 
of their Empire or their national interest demanded.  As Dwight Eisenhower angrily 
discovered on occasions, Winston Churchill -- and by 1955, Anthony Eden sans his 
mentor -- sought to safeguard Britain as a world power, at any expense.  If it upset the 
Anglo-American alliance in the process, so be it.  For as Eden and Churchill viewed it in 
the increasingly bi-polar climate of the Cold War, a Britain without its colonial holdings 
(i.e. Empire) stood only as a near-client state of the United States; indeed only a 
subservient Greek backwater in an idealist-based Roman Empire.   
Many of the roots of Suez are here.  The history of Anglo-American relations 
from the Great Rapprochement to the Special Relationship demonstrates that only when 
entwined by self-regarding national interest do countries rush to aid one another.  From 
its inception, during the Spanish-American War, up through the twentieth century, the on 
again, off again alliance between the United States and Great Britain left little room for 
sentimentality; it remained strictly business.  Pushed by differing objectives during the 
Suez Crisis, the U.S. and U.K. worked to their own discernible ends -- as they had 
consistently done in the past.  In November 1956, Britain sought to prolong its influence, 
prestige, and standing in the world.  During the same period, America looked for 
potential confederates to join in its struggle against Moscow.  Dual and opposing 
priorities of America’s quest for Cold War allies vs. British attempts to hold on to its 
waning empire came to a fever pitch.  Anglo-American interests were binary opposed; 
hence, the United States put the Atlantic Alliance on hold -- just as Churchill and Eden 
did on the matters of Vietnam and China.  On the battlegrounds of the Sinai Peninsula, 
America gained no advantage from a British victory, so felt no urgent need to seek one.  
If historical sentiment played any part in the U.S.’s decisions during Suez, it was not 
based on the cooperationist past of the two English-speaking powers, but more likely due 
to on an intense contempt against the British Empire rooted in the American psyche. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE LION AND THE SPHINX 
 
 
“In Egypt I see they are remembering the bombardment of Alexandria.  That kind of 
thing could be done in the Nineteenth Century: it cannot be done now, we are working 
under an entirely different code.”99 
-Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 1951 
 
“If we have any more of their [the Egyptians] cheek we will set the Jews on them and 
drive them into the gutter from which they should never have emerged.”100 
-Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 1951 
 
In 1956, exacerbated by recent events in the Middle East, Anthony Eden 
summoned his Private Secretary, Anthony Nutting, for a meeting. Nutting, on orders 
from his superior to formulate a plan to solve the perplexing problem of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, had utterly failed in his mentor’s estimation.  Angered at tepid proposals made by 
his protégé, the prime minister unleashed his fury.  Shouting across the telephone line 
Eden exclaimed, “What’s all this poppycock you’ve sent me . . . what’s all this nonsense 
about isolating Nasser or ‘neutralizing’ him, as you call it?”101  Bellowing to his aide he 
continued, “I want him destroyed, can’t you understand . . . and I don’t give a damn if 
there’s anarchy and chaos in Egypt.”102  Recounting in his memoirs, Nutting states that 
this encounter with the prime minister left him feeling as if he had just awoken from a 
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nightmare, “only the nightmare was real.”103  While many observers might find this 
proposed reaction by Anthony Eden justified in response to Nasser’s seizure of the Suez 
Canal, they might alter their opinion through the addition of one simple fact.  The 
conversation occurred in March, over five months before Egypt nationalized the Canal.  
For contrary to perceived notions Eden’s animosity with -- and one could almost term his 
unwavering hatred of -- Gamal Abdel Nasser stems prior to the events of the Suez Crisis.  
A strong case for the raison d'être in the British invasion of Egypt is not only the retaking 
of the canal, but also the overthrowing of this apparent nemesis of Eden.  Yet even before 
the rise of these combative men to the heads of their respective nations, Anglo-Egyptian 
relations stood routed for a likely collision. A successful imperialistic Britain and an 
independent nationalist Egypt were in many respects not a duel possibility.  Only with the 
Suez Crisis did these unstable mixtures of individuals and national interests finally find 
resolution.   
Cursed by their country’s geographical location, later exponentially buoyed by the 
creation of the Suez Canal, Egyptians found autonomy and self-determination as 
unreachable objectives through much of their history in the modern age.  Not without 
strong provocation, these descendants of kings and pharaohs can blame only one entity 
that bears the most responsibility for this national suppression -- namely the British 
Empire.  Drawn to the strategic importance of Egypt brought about by its centrally to 
three continents, the British, from an early age, sought to keep this region out of the 
hands of their foreign enemies.  From chasing a French revolutionary army headed by a 
young Corsican general away from the Nile, to supporting the Ottoman Turks rule over 
Egypt, the protection of this vital area remained an uttermost priority to London 
throughout the early 1800s.104  With the opening of the Suez Canal, the ante in the minds 
of those controlling Westminster upped substantively.  With the Empire now spreading 
across many parts of Asia and the Pacific, coupled with the still critical importance of 
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India to the motherland, quicker travel to these far-flung possessions stood as an 
imperative need.  In order to protect these hard fought-over lands from either internal 
uprisings or external invasions Britannia required the ability to transport her armies and 
navies swiftly.  This quicker waterway glimmered as a heaven-sent answer, yet it also 
arose new tactical priorities.  As historian Lawrence James writes, “The completion of 
the Franco-Egyptian-financed Suez Canal in 1869 increased the need for Britain to 
remain the dominant power in the Middle East.”105  Not to mention it also initiated an 
outright invasion and subsequent war.  In 1888, with an HRS flotilla riding anchor off its 
coastline, the defenders and inhabitants of Alexandria found themselves the first, but 
certainly not the last, Egyptians to discover the enormity of Britannia’s regard for their 
native land. 
After the cessation of Anglo-Egyptian War, while de jure control in Cairo 
formally laid at the feet of the Sultan of Turkey’s representative, de facto power rested at 
the door of the British High Commissioner.  The official status of the Kingdom of Egypt 
remained murky up until the 1930s, and British control stood as the reality for those 
intervening years.  However, concessions were needed to maintain this foreign grip over 
Egyptian internal affairs.  The major one of these allowances was the 1936 agreement to 
the removal of British troops, minus those protecting the Suez Canal, from Egyptian soil.  
This success by independence-seeking Egyptians stood only as a fleeting victory, for with 
the advent of World War II the British routinely reminded the citizens of Egypt who truly 
controlled their nation. On numerous occasions, they were not subtle. When King Faruq 
showed sympathy towards the Axis cause, tanks crashed through his palace gates.  
Flanked by aides brandishing pistols the British Ambassador then showed himself into 
the king’s quarters and ordered at gunpoint the indignant monarch to appoint a pro-Allied 
prime minister to govern Egypt; he wisely complied.   Although the British stranglehold 
over this Middle Eastern nation began to quickly dissipate with the transition from a 
world war to a cold one. 
In 1950, Egyptian demands for the promised withdraw of British troops steadily 
increased.  Spurred on by King Farouk, in a bid to retain his power in a sea of a 
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nationalist furor, anti-British demonstrations and terroristic acts directed at 
Commonwealth soldiers erupted. The focal point of these deeds of intimidation was 
largely directed at the Suez Canal Zone, whereby early 1952 its military base laid under 
virtual siege.  However, on January 26, the bloodletting spilled out onto the streets of the 
Egyptian capital.  Commonly known as Black Saturday, as a contemporary from the 
British embassy described, “It was a day of arson and rioting . . . resulting in the 
immediate deaths of two Englishmen.”106  He goes on to recount,  “One, dragged from 
the Turf Club in the centre of the city, was murdered, his body dismembered and burnt in 
the street; the other, cornered trying to escape by jumping from an upstairs window of the 
Club, was later found stabbed to death.”107  The final death toll “after weeks of rioting 
was put at seventeen British and other nationals living in Cairo.”108      
Through specifically targeting British citizens this civil unrest took to looking like 
a full-fledged reenactment of an Eastern Europe pogrom.  As then Foreign Minister 
Anthony Eden recalls, “A number of British-owned buildings were set on fire, as well as 
cinemas, restaurants, cafes, and department stores . . . the violence was in the main anti-
British.109”   He goes on to recount, “The material damage in central Cairo was later 
estimated to amount to three or four million pounds to British interests alone.”110  With 
“the country . . . teetering on the edge of anarchy,” British commanders in the Canal Zone 
made hasty preparations to march for Cairo to protect their countrymen’s lives and 
restore order.111  Yet an outlying, but interested, party declined to sanction this rescue 
effort. 112    Without this entity’s international support, Anthony Eden refused to issue the 
order.  The interested party was none other than the United States of America.113     
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Years before the official start of Suez Crisis, the United States sought to 
undermine any continued British neo-colonial control in Egypt.  By 1947, American 
policy towards Egypt and the entire Middle East was already changing direction from its 
British ally.  As Lawrence James explains, “the aim of America’s policy was to cajole 
rather than coerce independent Middle Eastern states into the West’s camp.”114  Earlier 
Cold War considerations had intertwined an Anglo-American need of maintaining the 
large network of airfields of the Canal Zone in British hands for the possible bombing of 
southern oil-rich regions in the Soviet Union.   However, after the boon of Ankara 
allowing the building of U.S. airbases in Turkey, the American necessity for continued 
Western control of the Canal Zone evaporated.  By the beginning of the 1950s, the 
attitude of Washington toward Egypt shifted to one similar to that London held in the 
early 1800s.  While strategic and direct control stood as an essential imperative for the 
British, the American government deemed it unnecessary.  As long as unfettered access 
to the Suez Canal remained open, who owned the waterway -- the Egyptians or the 
British -- mattered little to the U.S.  The major factor for this laissez-faire attitude of the 
Americans rested upon their priorities, specifically ideology over economics.  Unlike 
Britain, which depended on canal access for Middle Eastern oil, the United States during 
the 1950s supplied it petroleum needs from sources primarily in the Western hemisphere.  
As Anthony Eden’s private secretary, who later headed Middle Eastern Affairs at the 
Foreign Office, Evelyn Shuckburgh explained, “for the United States the Cold War is 
paramount, whereas for the United Kingdom our economic strength is at the moment 
fundamental.”115  Chief on the agenda for the United States remained to contain the 
international spread of communism and the influence of the Soviet Union.  Supporting a 
British intervention against a non-aligned native population, such as the one proposed in 
1952, simply did not fit that bill -- nor would a bloody battle over an open canal for that 
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matter.116  Even so the Americans did not have to cross that last bridge for another four 
years.   
In spite of the fact that the wrath of the Egyptians took the form of anti-British 
riots in the early months of 1952, it soon turned back to a long-simmering anger directed 
towards their monarch.  When the Jews of Palestine declared their independence in 1948, 
King Farouk had followed suit with his fellow Arabic leaders and invaded the newly 
minted nation of Israel.  Although their collected goal stood to push the Zionists back into 
the sea from wince they came, it did not go as planned.  Popular resentment of this 
failure, compounded by a rising Arab nationalism, and rampant corruption in his 
government finally brought a reckoning for King Farouk.  On July 22, 1952, a cabal of 
young Egyptian military commanders, known as the Free Officers Movement, overthrew 
their unpopular sovereign and took charge of the country.117  Caught off guard by the turn 
of events, all the foreign embassies in Cairo, “were taken by surprise, none more so than 
the British embassy.”118  The response to the regime change by London stood restrained.  
As an Egyptian journalist recounts, “had the King commanded the smallest degree of 
confidence they [the British] might have backed him, but he did not.  Nor was there any 
real excuse for forcible intervention.”119 Despite some initial trepidation diplomacy 
between British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, and the new Egyptian leader, 
Muhammad Naguib started well.  Eden, who sought a solution for Sudanese 
independence from Egypt, found the first president of Egypt, Naguib, quite malleable to a 
settled agreement on the situation.120  Nevertheless, by February 1953, Anglo-Egyptian 
cooperation hit a major snag.  Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second-ranking member of the 
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Army Council of Revolution after President Naguib, declared in a fiery speech that if 
British forces did not “immediately and unconditionally” withdraw from the Suez Canal 
Zone, they would need to “fight for their lives.”121  To say the least, the young Interior 
Minister of Egypt did not like to mince his words. 
Nasser first began speaking out against the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which 
allowed British troops to remain stationed in the Suez Canal Zone, in October 1952.  In 
an interview with Margaret Higgins of the New York Times, he demanded a total removal 
of all British forces from Egypt within six months.122   He also pressed for a renegotiating 
of the ’36 Treaty or threatened increased guerrilla attacks on British encampments.123  
Nasser’s less-than-diplomatic rhetoric on this issue brought him a windfall of support; 
forcing the colonial presence of the British Empire out of Sinai Peninsula held an almost 
universal appeal to the Egyptian populace.  As his Minister of the Interior continued to 
issue not-so-veil threats of death to soldiers of the United Kingdom, President Naguib 
found the U.K.’s closest ally wooing him for Egyptian support.   
Only four months after taking office, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles paid 
the new leader of Egypt a visit in May of 1953.124  Looking to promote American 
goodwill, Dulles arrived in Cairo bearing a unique gift.  While the British stationed in the 
Suez Canal Zone were suffering up to a dozen casualties a day from Egyptian snipers and 
saboteurs, the American diplomat graciously gave the de facto dictator a pistol.125  The 
pearl-handled revolver came inscribed: “To General Naguib from his friend Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.”126  Intentional or not, the present should have registered, at least in part, 
where American sympathies or lack thereof laid.  Also on his visit, Dulles found time to 
sit down with, who knowledgeable observers viewed as the rising power in Egypt, Gamal 
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Nasser.  In their meeting, Dulles pressed Nasser into joining a forthcoming regional anti-
communist pact directed against the Soviet Union.127  Refusing to commit to such an 
alliance, Nasser, in turn, requested from the American government two things, weapons 
and diplomatic support in forcing the 80,000 British soldiers off Egyptian soil.  On the 
issue of arms sales, Dulles remained evasive, but the Egyptian Interior Minister did have 
an effect on him concerning the other two matters discussed.  As a close confidant of 
Nasser later recounted, “Dulles was influenced by the strength of Nasser’s arguments 
against Egypt’s joining a mutual security pact and afterwards Dulles drew back from 
wholehearted support of the Baghdad Pact.”128  In addition, the American diplomat 
“became convinced of the need to ease the path of Britain’s withdrawal from Egypt.”129 
While historians continue to argue over the amount of influence Dulles held over 
American foreign policy vis-à-vis Eisenhower, on this last matter the argument can be 
considered moot.  As the president wrote in his memoirs, concerning that particular issue 
Eisenhower and, after his meeting with Nasser, Dulles stood in complete agreement.  
Writing on the subject Eisenhower states, “I believed that it would be undesirable and 
impracticable for the British to retain sizable forces permanently in the territory of a 
jealous and resentful government amid an open hostile population.”130  While 
Eisenhower’s assessment on the feasibility of the British retention of their strategic 
foothold is debatable, the president fails to recount that his same estimation could apply 
to American involvement around the world in his nation’s past and then near future. 
Pressed by the Dulles and Eisenhower, Winston Churchill reluctantly reentered 
talks with Egypt over its continued troop presence in the Canal Zone in 1954.  As with 
previous discussions between the parties, sticking points still held up a suitable 
agreement.   While Naguib and Nasser considered the Suez Canal Zone as the rightful 
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property of their nation, Churchill and Eden sought to uphold the terms of 1936 Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty that granted sovereignty of this territory to Great Britain until 1956.  
This year “1956” stood as looming deadline for the United Kingdom.  When signing the 
treaty in 1936, Anthony Eden agreed to only a twenty-year charter for British control of 
the zone, but with a caveat stating at the end of that time period a renegotiation of the 
treaty would commence.  By 1954, with the current state of affairs between Great Britain 
and Egypt standing as they were, the chances of a new treaty favorable to the interests of 
the U.K. looked quite dismal.  However as the parley between the two governments 
continued fortune shined on the British Empire, for the Egyptian negotiators sought an 
agreement as soon as possible.   
Since the overthrow of the King, two years before, the stability of the Egyptian 
government remained -- in one word -- shaky.  After taking power, as even a close 
confidant of Gamal Abdel Nasser admits, the members of the Revolutionary Command 
Council held no calculated agenda for bettering their nation; he writes, “apart from 
getting rid of the King and his corrupt associates, the Free Officers had few plans.”131 
Unhappy with the perceived lack of progress by their new national leaders, factory 
workers rioted less than a month after the military coup, “when the police and army 
attempted to restore order nine people were killed and more than twenty were 
wounded.”132 Rudderless from the beginning, the Egyptian ship of state found itself beset 
by an increasingly amount of internal criticism -- with a substantial amount coming from 
a growing religious faction calling itself the Muslim Brotherhood.133  In a wise bid to 
foster national cohesion, Nasser sought to coalesce the discontented Egyptian population 
around a common and popular cause.  Driving a time-honored colonial power’s military 
from this nation’s soil was the route he sought.  It proved a popular one. With Egypt in 
the midst of an undeclared guerrilla war with the British army, Nasser’s countrymen 
naturally rallied to the cause.  Yet the Interior Minister’s compatriots demanded results, 
or at the very least substantial process towards driving the foreigners out.  Since the ill-
equipped Egyptian military stood little chance in a direct confrontation with the 80,000 
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Commonwealth soldiers fortified in the Canal Zone, negotiations with the hated British 
Empire proved the quickest solution to the status of forces dilemma and, also, in righting 
the helm of the Egyptian state.  Efforts to rush an agreement with London 
notwithstanding, Muhammad Naguib, the first president of Egypt, still fell from power.  
Confined to house arrest and stripped of all his official positions, Naguib would spend the 
next eighteen years as a prisoner of the country he once governed. His usurper turned out 
not to be from the ranks of religious zealots, secular communists, or counterrevolutionary 
monarchists as he might have feared, but that of his ablest lieutenant.  By September 
1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser, after overthrowing his revolutionary confederate, had 
become the unquestioned ruler of Egypt at the age of 36.134   
On October 19, the final signatures of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement took place.  
Considered by some as the true date of Egyptian independence, both sides gave up much 
from their perspectives to achieve it. While, as mentioned above, both parties had selfish 
interests in concluding an arrangement, they also found themselves beset with an outside 
pressure to come to a quick rapport.  Prior to signing the treaty, each side found the 
United States pushing them into an arraignment. As former official historian to the 
British Cabinet Office William Walker explains both, “The British government under 
American pressure to take risks in order to win Egyptian friendship; and the Egyptians 
were being encouraged to be reasonable by American promises of generous economic 
and military aid.”135  The final terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement included as 
Walker states:  “British troops would leave Egypt 20 months after the new agreement was 
signed; the base would be taken over and run by British civilian contractors for an initial 
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period of seven years.”136   However a “trigger for military reactivation of the base would 
be an attack on any Arab state and Turkey by an ‘outside power’ other than Israel.”137  
Finally the “agreement was gilded by Egypt extending overflying rights and landing 
facilities to the RAF, and by an Egyptian reaffirmation of the 1888 Constantinople 
Convention, guaranteeing freedom of transit throughout the Suez Canal to all nations in 
peace time.”138 
Initially the Egyptians and British governments were similarly pleased with their 
collective settlement.  Nasser got the withdrawal of British troops and international 
respect for bringing the conflict to a peaceful resolution.  Eden, still foreign secretary, 
received an extended lease on the Canal Zone and its military installations, plus a signed 
commitment for its quick reinforcement by British forces in times of war.  However, the 
euphoria in London and Cairo did not last long.   
A week after the official signing of the agreement, during a speech celebrating the 
impending withdrawal of the British troops, a would-be assassin fired eight shots at 
Nasser.139  Angry at the treaty, the shooter, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, sought 
to punish the new Egyptian leader for his perceived collaboration with the colonial 
British.  Shortly afterward Nasser instituted a violent crackdown on the Brotherhood and 
other potential insurgents.  Now very mindful of the fates of the two men who previously 
ruled Egypt before him, Nasser also sought ways to bolster his support among his fellow 
countrymen.  While he introduced domestic improvements, such as land reform and 
infrastructure developments, Nasser also sought popular acclaim through the avenue of 
foreign affairs. Wishing to champion himself as a proponent for Arab nationalism and a 
foe of Western imperialism, the young president of Egypt found hindering British 
interests as the means to this goal.  Never coy, Nasser more-or-less stated this fact in a 
fateful gathering with none other than his future chief adversary during the Suez Crisis --
Anthony Eden. 
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Four days before the one and only meeting between Anthony Eden and Gamal 
Nasser, Turkey and Iraq signed a mutual defense treaty colorfully termed the Northern 
Tier.140  The agreement stood as the first step towards the creation of METO (Middle 
East Treaty Organization) or more commonly called the Bagdad Pact.141  Formed on the 
same basis as the European-orientated NATO and the Asia-Pacific SEATO, the Bagdad 
Pact’s genesis laid in Western attempts to contain communist expansion in a specific 
global region.   
Unsurprisingly this intimal step towards METO dominated the two men’s 
conversation as they sat down in the British Embassy in Cairo on February 24, 1955.  
Looking to regain Egypt’s strategic position firmly back into the column of the West, 
Eden pressed Nasser to join the emerging pact.  Nasser, just as he did with Dulles in their 
meeting two years before, attempted to lay out the reasons why joining such a pact did 
not benefit Egyptian interests.  Unlike Dulles, Eden remained unmoved by Nasser 
arguments and took the rejection somewhat as a personal affront.  With the rise of Arab 
nationalism and the rulers of Middle Eastern nations seeking more autonomy from British 
involvement in their countries’ affairs, Eden viewed METO as the key to keeping the 
critical region under the influence of the United Kingdom.  Without Nasser’s 
participation in the Bagdad Pact, it severely limited the agreement’s usefulness and 
undermined its legibility in the eyes of the world.  In addition, without Egypt joining into 
the treaty, America, fearful of alienating Nasser and the millions of Arabs who he 
influenced, refused to enter the organization as well.   Still leaving the meeting, Eden, 
now mindful of Nasser, still did not view the Egyptian leader as an outright enemy, just 
difficult.142  However, after taking office as prime minister of Great Britain, Eden’s 
attitude radically changed.  
Despite Nasser’s outright refusal to join the METO, Anthony Eden, now prime 
minister after succeeding the retiring Churchill on April 6, sought to pressure Egypt into 
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joining the organization by others means -- namely carrots and sticks.  First, alongside 
their American ally, Great Britain offered funding for a major infrastructure program 
close to Nasser’s heart.  Since seizing power, Nasser longed to build a dam on the Nile at 
Aswan.  Seemingly unmoved by this gesture of goodwill, Nasser continued his anti-
British campaign.  Broadcasting from powerful radio stations to large sections of the 
Middle East, the Egyptian leader spoke out against the Bagdad Pact and perceived British 
colonialism it represented.143  The need for action only intensified when in September, 
with the full blessing of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia sold 250 million dollars of 
military equipment to Egypt.144  Fearful that this very harmonious gesture by a Warsaw 
Pact nation was the first step of communist encroachment into the Middle East, Anthony 
Eden now maneuvered to isolate Nasser’s influence in the region.145  He sought to 
achieve this detachment by bringing the nation of Jordan into METO.  As it became more 
and more apparent to both the Arab populace and their unelected leaders, Eden and 
Nasser were now engaged in a struggle for which one of them would lead the Arab 
world.  If Jordan joined the Bagdad Pact, it signified to all that it sided with Britain, but if 
the nation declined Nasser substantially benefited.  According to then British Foreign 
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, King Abdullah I bin al-Hussein initially agreed to bring Jordan 
into the pact.146  However, by January 1956, with public pressure vigorously stirred by 
Egyptian propaganda, the government of Jordan ceded in the face of violent 
demonstrations to withhold joining METO.147  For Nasser, the non-event marked a major 
victory, to Eden a bitter defeat.  As events in Jordan continued to transpire, what came 
next marked Gamal Abdel Nasser as a dead man in the eyes of Anthony Eden. 
The murky transition from colonial province to an independent state occasionally 
created unlikely couplings.  By 1956, in the case of the transfiguration from Transjordan 
to the Kingdom of Jordan, one such eccentric paring remained.  Since its independence 
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from Great Britain in 1946, the nation of Jordan had had a British officer as the 
commander of its army. Lieutenant-General John Glubb stood as a walking anachronism; 
born and raised in England, he had commanded the Arab Legion (the Jordanian army) 
since 1939.  While his leadership of a foreign army probably seemed odd to many around 
the world, in Great Britain it stood as a guarded sense of pride and respect.  All that 
evaporated when on March 1, 1956, bowing to the internal anti-British sentiment of his 
subjects and wanting to assert his authority, King Hussein unceremoniously discharged 
Glubb of his position.148  As Harold Macmillan recounts the dismissal of Glubb, caused 
an uproar in London for, “the blow to British prestige was serious.”149 As explanations 
were sought in the House of Commons for this drastic failure, Anthony Eden saw only 
one man as the instigator of this very British humiliation -- Gamal Nasser.  Unperturbed 
by the lack of facts, the British Prime Minster devoutly believed that only Nasser’s 
nefarious influence had brought the King to dismiss Glubb.150  Believing drastic 
measures were now justified to halt the Egyptian leader, Eden sought Nasser’s removal 
from power, by any means necessary.  
Recounting in his diary on March 12, Evelyn Shuckburgh describes how Eden 
exclaimed to him in regards to Nasser that, “it is either him or us, don’t forget that.”151 As 
British historian Calder Walton elaborates, “Eden became obsessed with overthrowing 
Nasser, and tasked SIS to instigate a coup to depose or even assassinate.”152 Adding to 
the macabre aspect of this unveiling scene came revelations by former assistant Director 
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of MI-5 Peter Wright in his controversial bestselling memoir Spycatcher (1987).  By mid-
1956, Wright asserts, “MI6 [had] developed a plan, through the London Station, to 
assassinate Nasser using nerve gas.”153 Candidly speaking of his involvement in the 
attempt, Wright states, “Their plan was to place canisters of nerve gas inside the 
ventilation system, but I pointed out that this would require large quantities of gas, and 
would result in massive loss of life among Nasser’s staff.”154  While these notions from a 
second-rate spy novel amounted to naught, Eden’s blinding hatred for Nasser remained 
absolute.  As Anthony Nutting recounts after the dismissal of Glubb in March, “the next 
three months passed somewhat uneventfully and without offering any opportunity for 
Eden to translate his declaration of war on Nasser into action.”155  “In June the last 
British troops left Egyptian soil,” Eden’s private secretary continues, “and with their 
departure calm seemed to settle on the scene.”156  This respite stood only as the waning 
serenity before the arrival of a looming hurricane.  As Nutting explains, “I knew all too 
well, it was a deceptive calm.  Sooner or later an incident was bound to occur in that most 
explosive area which would give Eden the pretext he sought to move in on Egypt and try 
to smash Nasser.”157 In July, thanks to a chain of events originating in America, Eden 
received his wish; however, he would come to regret it ruefully. 
By the summer of 1956, events formed an environment where a confrontation 
between Egypt and Great Britain stood as highly probable.  While considerable blame for 
this situation must lie at the feet of the national leaders in these two countries, another 
source is exceedingly culpable as well.  The United States must not go unmentioned in its 
share of responsibility.  Playing a shell game with where their allegiance laid, the 
Eisenhower administration constantly sent mixed signals to both the British and the 
Egyptians.  No shining example stands as clear as the U.S.’s position on the Bagdad Pact.  
After the signing of Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, relations between Britain and 
Egypt improved, yet rancor over METO brought them again to an adversarial position.  
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Initial American enthusiasm, especially from John Foster Dulles, sold Britain on the need 
of the Pact’s formation. However when it came time to put pen to paper, the U.S. refused 
to join.  Writing on the topic, Harold Macmillan states American Secretary of State 
Dulles, “had used every possible pressure upon us to become full members and to give it 
our active support; but he continued, throughout 1955, to refuse . . . to commit the United 
States to membership.  That decision placed the whole burden upon Britain.”158  Even 
after America itself baulked at joining the organization in response to Nasser’s attacks on 
the Pact, the United States continued to manipulate its would-be direction from behind 
the scenes.  It was none other than the U.S. who urged Britain to press Jordan into joining 
METO.  Macmillan states that the Eisenhower administration anxiously urged the British 
to, “persuade Jordan to join in order to relieve the isolation of Iraq, at present the only 
Arab member inside the Pact.”159  This American request brought Anglo-Egyptian 
relations to an even lower ebb for reasons stated previously.  
On the Egyptian side of the British-Egyptian divide, an unreliable America caused 
problems as well.  Attempting to coax gratitude from the Nasser regime, a double-dealing 
Dulles offered to use American influence to prevent further Arab membership in the 
Bagdad Pact.  While discussing such a proposal, Dulles argued, “I believe that Nasser 
would be willing to pay a considerable price to get the United States in limiting the 
Baghdad Pact to its present Arab membership.160  Adding to this Janus-faced stance on 
METO, is the U.S. continued refusal to sell arms to Egypt; even after intimating such an 
arrangement stood as a distinct possibility.  As Dwight Eisenhower writes, “As early as 
February of that year [1955] Nasser had attempted to obtain arms from the United 
States.”161  Instead of outright rejecting the offer, as the British desired, the Americans 
left the door to such a proposal not quite shut.  “Our State Department,” Eisenhower 
continues, “confident that [Nasser] was short of money, informed him that payment 
would be expected in cash rather than barter.”162  A major motivation for the 1955 
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Egyptian-Czech arms deal that concerned Eden was an attempt by Nasser to cajole 
America to sell arms to Egypt by playing off its cold war fears.163 Although the Egyptian 
leader’s ruse failed, it contributed greatly to distrust between Britain and Egypt.  Heading 
into the maelstrom of the Suez Crisis, it is without a doubt America contributed greatly to 
the atmosphere that provoked it. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
INTO THE VORTEX 
(July 19 –October 28) 
 
 
“Britain considered Suez as something as a symbol, a symbol of their position in the 
entire Middle East and the Arab world; their reaction [to its seizure] was not immediately 
predictable but it would require all we could do to keep the lid from blowing off.” 
Dwight Eisenhower, reflecting on Suez164 
 
“The Americans would not have moved until all was lost.  All through the Canal 
negotiations Dulles was twisting and wriggling and lying to do nothing.” 
-Anthony Eden, reflecting on Suez165 
 
Not surprisingly, given its then recent history of involvement between the two 
nations, an act by America sparked Anthony Eden’s long-awaited confrontation between 
Egypt and the United Kingdom.  Around noon on June 19, 1956, in meeting with the 
Egyptian Ambassador, John Foster Dulles calmly lit the spark that exploded into the Suez 
Crisis.166  Originating about a year before, the reason for this hastily planned consultation 
boiled down to money -- Nasser desperately needed it, and Dulles steadfastly refused it.  
Since taking office, Nasser “had been working to turn his dream of building a high dam 
at Aswan into a reality.”167  This massive building project was estimated to cost $1 billion 
dollars, “which $400 million would have to be in foreign currency.”168  While the World 
Bank promised, half of this external sum (200 million) to Egypt, Nasser still required the 
rest from another source.  In an effort to foster closer relations and to forestall a proposal 
of aid by the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower Administration tentatively offered to provide 
loans to help make-up the difference.169  The terms of such an agreement tied a 
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substantial American loan with the offer of aid by the World Bank.  It also included a 
pledge, made before the Anglo-Egyptian incidents over Jordan, of around 14 million in 
sterling by the United Kingdom.170  Although eager to build the dam, Nasser, fearful of 
Egypt falling into the orbit of the United States, refused implicit conditions tacked on a 
potential Egyptian-American loan agreement.171  These stipulations primary included 
attempts by America to influence the foreign policy of Egypt -- such as getting Nasser to 
support a U.S. sponsored Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and halting arms purchases from 
the communist bloc.172   As negotiations over the Aswan aid package stalled, U.S. 
enthusiasm waned, for as Anthony Eden notes, “The Egyptian financial position 
deteriorated and it became more and more doubtful whether the Egyptian government 
would be able to cover their part of the inevitable expenditure for the dam project.”173 
Astoundingly, Eden, now actively plotting Nasser’s demise, actually thought it best not to 
rescind formally the Western offer to aid the Aswan project, but to simply  let it “wither 
on the vine.”174  However, by mid-summer 1956, his American allies thought a message 
need to be sent to Nasser.  One clarifying that in the view of Eisenhower and Dulles, 
Egypt rapidly had to choose if it stood with America or the Soviets; in their estimation, 
no middle ground would suffice. 
In May, Egypt formally extended diplomatic recognition to mainland China.175  In 
a bid to circumvent an impending United Nations arms embargo on sells to Middle 
Eastern nations, Nasser planned to buy weapons from the Red Chinese, who were not 
members of the U.N. so not bound to any such embargo.176  The news of this latest 
Egyptian embracement with a communist power stood as the final straw in Washington 
D.C.; Nasser required a stern lesson.  Up to the task, Dulles gave it to him in spades.  One 
minute after Ahmed Hussin, Egypt’s Ambassador to the U.S., walked through Dulles’ 
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door at the State Department for his June 19 meeting, a spokesperson for the Department, 
“issued a statement to waiting reporters announcing the withdrawal of America’s offer of 
aid.”177  Before the two men had even uttered a word, the U.S. announced its intentions 
on the matter to the world.   Stunned at this undiplomatic display of bluster, Nasser found 
himself at a vulnerable place on the international stage.178  Even excluding the public 
humiliation by the American, Dulles’ act stung the Egyptian president hard.  For with the 
withdrawal of potential U.S. aid, the World Bank revoked its agreement of assistance on 
the Aswan project as well, since the two offers were interlinked. Backed onto a ledge 
custom-made by the United States, Nasser needed to find a way to 1) regain his stature in 
eyes of the world, and 2) find alternative funding for the Aswan Dam to retain his 
popularity in Egypt.  Refusing to jump into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union or fall 
into the lap of a reconciliatory America, Nasser, to the extreme detriment of the British 
Empire, decided to leap.  
On July 26, when word first arrived in London and Washington that Nasser had 
seized the Suez Canal, Anthony Eden and Dwight Eisenhower took the bulletin quite 
differently.  In America, its president urged caution; in Great Britain, its prime minister 
demanded war.  Dining with the King of Iraq and the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said 
when the news broke, Eden received some hurried advice from one of his guests.  Nuri 
counseling Eden, told him, “You only have one course of action open and that is to hit, 
hit now, and hit hard.  Otherwise it will be too late.  If [Nasser] is left alone, he will finish 
all of us.”179  Although this shrewd advice did not fall on deaf ears, it stood 
superfluously.  For the British prime minister already understood the stakes and knew 
which course to proceed down.  Writing in his memoirs, Eden recounts his thoughts of 
that July evening, “I had no doubt how Nasser’s deed would be read . . . [t]his was a 
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seizure of Western property in reply to the action of the United States Government.  
Upon its outcome would depend whose authority would prevail.”180   Eden quickly 
adjourned to the Cabinet Room with his foreign minister, Selwyn Lloyd; the Lord 
Chancellor, David Maxwell Fyfe; the Lord President of the Council, Robert Gascoyne-
Cecil (5th Marquess of Salisbury), and  Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
Alec Douglas-Home.181  Rapidly summoned to join the impromptu meeting were the 
chiefs of staff of the armed forces; the French Ambassador, Jean Chauvel; and in lieu of 
the U.S. Ambassador, the American Charge d’Affaires, Andrew Foster.182  The inclusion 
of the nation’s top echelon military leaders plus representatives of the country’s two 
closest strategic allies set the tone of the meeting.  Eden desired quick and unflinching 
action; however, it would not work out as he hoped.   
The prime minister hurriedly laid out the first order of business.  In front of his 
assembled advisors and the two foreign emissaries he directly asked, “When can we take 
military action to topple Nasser [and] free the canal?” It was a simple question, backed by 
a logical viewpoint.   For a mighty empire that retained over 750,000 active duty soldiers 
and spent around ten per cent of its gross national product on its military, it seems hard to 
believe that Great Britain did not have the capacity to recapture the Canal quite rapidly 
after Nasser nationalized it.183  Yet after conversing with his chiefs of staff, that is exactly 
what Eden ruefully discovered.  Lord Louis Mountbatten, First Sea Lord and Chief of 
Naval Staff, was first to douse Eden’s hopes of a speedily retaking of the Canal by 
recommending that due to numerous restraints, “unilateral action by the Royal Navy and 
the Royal Marines should not be taken.”184 As Mountbatten and the other military 
commanders explained, if a successful military operation against Nasser were to be 
conducted it would take time.185  As accounts of this initial meeting of July 26 and 
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numerous subsequent consultations of the chiefs of staff show, the British military faced 
numerous problems that severely limited its initial response capabilities to the crisis.186   
These hindering complications were two-fold.  The first revolved around logistics 
and infrastructure.  With the forfeit of the Canal Zone in June, the U.K. did not have a 
military base near enough to Egypt equipped for handling the massive ships and 
numerous landing crafts needed to conduct an invasion.  In addition, while Britain did 
have over three-quarters of a million men in arms, these forces were widely spread 
throughout the globe protecting the rest of the Empire.  It would take a lot of precious 
time to redirect them against this new objective.  The second series of limitations for the 
British boiled down to the absence of planning.187  In 1956, all of Great Britain’s defense 
arrangements boiled down to dealing with only two likely threats.  Either an all-out 
nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union or fighting insurgency in its colonies, “almost no 
provision existed for limited or conventional war of the old sort.”188  However facing 
these stark realities gave Eden little pause in altering his favored course of action.  For 
him only the timetable needed changing -- the dogs of war were still to be unleashed.  
After a meeting with the full Cabinet, Eden found it members supporting this assessment. 
Reviewing Nasser’s action they agreed, “That our essential interest in the area must, if 
necessary, be safeguarded by military action and that the necessary preparations to this 
end must be made.”189  As Harold Macmillan recalled, “the unanimous view of my 
colleagues was in favor of strong and resolute action.”190  Provisions started immediately 
to gear Britain for the forthcoming conflict.  Given the title of “Operation Musketeer” by 
the chiefs of staff, this plan for an invasion of Egypt quickly began taking form.   In the 
first days of the crisis, as the drums for righteous battle steadily increased their pounding 
across Albion, on the other side of the Atlantic they remained quite muted.   
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After the initial news of the seizure of the Suez Canal broke in Washington, the 
primarily concern of President Eisenhower was not to punish Nasser, but to restrain 
Eden.  From the American perspective, the need of this containment of British action 
became readily apparent shortly after Eisenhower received a message from Eden on July 
27.   In the telegraph, Eden argued that Britain and the U.S. “cannot afford to allow 
Nasser to seize control of the Canal in this way.”191 Intimating the direction of action 
needed, Eden argued that, “we should not allow ourselves to become involved in legal 
quibbles about the rights of the Egyptian government to nationalize what is technically an 
Egyptian company.”192  Then to put a finer point on it the Englishman stated, “As we see 
it we are unlikely to obtain our objectives by economic pressure alone.”193 It took little 
reading of the subtext of the two-page message for Eisenhower to see how Eden wanted 
to handle the affair.  Negotiations were not the answer; force of arms was the only 
solution. With his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles away in South America, 
Eisenhower took direct control in the efforts to tempter British fury over the new crisis.  
Less than 24 hours after receiving Eden’s communication, the president circumspectly 
replied, “While we agree with much that you have to say, we rather think there are one or 
two additional thoughts that you might consider.”194  It was not the forceful answer Eden 
hoped to receive, yet it did allow for interpretation. Next, due to the unavailability of 
Dulles, Eisenhower sent Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy to London.  The 
president’s instructions to Murphy are telling of his opinion of the matter; he ordered 
Murphy to “just go over and hold the fort,” and avoid committing America, “in any 
precipitate action with the French and British.”195 It appeared in Eisenhower’s estimation 
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the potential reaction of America’s allies stood as a far greater concern than the original 
seizure of the Canal.     
The causes behind the initial deviation of Anglo-American reactions to Nasser’s 
confiscation of the Suez Canal are stark and telling.  Embedded here are many reasons 
why America left Britannia to fend for herself as the crisis deepens.  While the personal 
hatred that Eden held toward Nasser, which was conspicuously absence in Eisenhower, 
obviously played an important influence, other significant factors contributed to how the 
two men conversely viewed the crisis. A truly jumbled mosaic of reasons, justifications, 
and national and personal interests motivated the distinct acts of the Atlantic powers 
when confronting the predicament.    
One cannot overlook the potential economic implications of Nasser’s action for 
the British compared to the Americans.  In 1956, 80 percent of oil supplying Western 
Europe came through the Suez Canal.196  At the beginning of August, Britain had only a 
strategic stockpile of six weeks’ worth of oil to reply upon if the Canal closed, after that 
the lights were out and the cars grounded to a halt.197 Although Nasser guaranteed to keep 
the Canal fully operational as long as Egypt retained control of it, to the British any 
promise of the Egyptian leader was highly dubious at best.  As Eden surmised with 
Nasser controlling the Canal it effectively meant, “He held a knife to our jugular;” or as 
Harold Macmillan articulated, “having his thump on our windpipe.”198  Even with setting 
aside the hyperbolic rhetoric of the two men, they still raised a valid point. With the vast 
wealth of oil in the Northern Sea still undiscovered, Britain remained especially 
dependent on Middle Eastern sources.  Just the possible closure of the Suez Canal left the 
British economy standing on very shaky ground.  As Yale professor Diane Kunz recounts 
as early as the “afternoon of July 27 . . . sterling was under such strong pressure that the 
Bank of England could not determine the rate for transferable sterling.”199  Impossible to 
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put it more bluntly, the Executive Director of the Bank of England stated on August 1, 
“[T]he situation created by the Egyptian Government imperils the survival of the U.K. 
and the Commonwealth, and represents a very great danger to sterling.”200  Through the 
eyes of the British, Nasser’s nationalization of the Canal looked like an economic quietus 
by a hostile power.  Thus in order to safeguard her monetary and financial well-being, 
Britannia needed to reverse this egregious event as soon as possible.  
An ocean away, things looked quite different.  Economically speaking the seizure 
of the Canal seemed to raise little concern in the halls of the United States government.  
In a Cabinet meeting on July 27, concerns over the subject of the Suez and its effect on 
the free transit of oil were viewed as a problem for Europe, not the homeland.201  
According to the record of the meeting, Eisenhower seemed more concerned on how the 
nationalization of Suez Canal might influence the control of a more vital waterway for 
America – the Panama Canal, than its direct result on the United States.202  By early as 
August 3, while the British government continued to view itself still under an economic 
sword of Damocles, for the U.S. Secretary of Treasury George Humphrey the situation, 
still only in its first week, was already abating.  In that day’s Cabinet meeting, Humphrey 
stated, “that the quieting down of the crisis was very helpful to the Treasury.”203  He 
added that lower interest rates for American borrowing seemed certain in “the near 
future.”204  On this supposition, Humphrey confuses coloration with causation -- as the 
sterling stood under attack, it made logical sense for the American dollar to rally. With 
investors and speculators alike attempting to flee the troubled British currency, the 
rational safe haven was the American greenback. Hence, the continued control of Suez 
Canal by a hostile power to Britain (i.e. Egypt) actually strengthened the United States 
economic position in the world.   Even more to the point, if the British did invade Egypt 
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the likelihood of Nasser blocking or damaging the Canal out of vengeance stood as very 
likely.  If this scenario came to pass and the Canal remained inoperable for an extended 
period of time, then the vast majority of Western Europe’s petroleum needs would have 
to be supplied mainly from the Western Hemisphere.205 While the United States planned 
for this happenstance, its leaders viewed it as very unappealing.206 For it meant unpopular 
oil rationing for Americans and probable limiting of economic growth for the nation.207 
For all these reasons, from the financial standpoint of America the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal was acceptable, but a British attempt in retaking it was not.  
Popular opinion and political support also played a significant role in how the 
American and British governments proceeded to deal with the crisis.  As early as the last 
days of July, London-based newspapers started calling for a rapid response to the crisis.   
The Daily Mail advised, “We must cry ‘Halt!’ to Nasser as we should have cried ‘Halt’ to 
Hitler.  Before he sets the Middle East aflame, as Hitler did Europe.”208 Harkening with 
similar sentiments was The Times, the News Chronicle, and the Daily Herald.209  
Comparisons of Nasser to Hitler were ubiquitous throughout the daily papers and on the 
nightly airwaves.  Even Hugh Gaitskill, the leader of the Labor Party, got in on the act.  
In addressing the House of Commons on August 2, Eden’s primary political opponent 
claimed Nasser’s aims were, “all very familiar.  It is exactly the same as that we 
encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war.”210  As the nation 
rallied to Anthony Eden’s anti-Nasser crusade, support from other areas of the 
Commonwealth also bolstered his determination.  In a rejoinder to a cable from Eden, the 
Prime Minister of New Zealand made his nation’s sentiments publicly clear.  He stated, 
“I was able to tell Sir Anthony Eden . . . that Britain could count on New Zealand 
standing by her through thick or thin . . . .Where Britain stands, we stand; where she 
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goes, we go; in good times and in the bad.”211  Certainly, a stark response compared to 
the vacillating reaction offered by the U.S. president.  Even without substantial American 
support, popular backing for direct action in regaining the Canal remained high 
throughout Great Britain.212 As historian David Dutton describes, “In the first days after 
nationalization the elements of a Suez consensus appeared to fall into place.”213  While 
this initial wave for war dampened in the preceding weeks, in America it never reached 
even close to such a fever pitch. In fact, throughout the United States it stood as 
nonexistent. 
A July 30 article by Harold Callender in the New York Times sums up the tone for 
a vast number of Americans to the crisis. For Callender the entire construct of, “the Suez 
Canal is a relic and a symbol of an age of European imperialism this is passing.”214  In 
1956 America, much of anti-colonialism sentiment fostered since 1776 had not faded.  
While pro-Nasser romanticism did not factor into the equation during the early days of 
July and August, an abiding sympathy for the Egyptian people stood out.  As a New York 
Times editorial appearing in August argues, the real issue is not the control of the Canal 
but, “the question of what can be done to improve the lives of people as groups and of 
individuals as persons . . . . How do the Egyptian people themselves and their neighbors 
stand to come out of this dispute?”215 Bleeding heart sentiments like this aside, as 
Professor Diane Kunz states, the American press  did express some concern, “about the 
nationalization of the canal but viewed the matter as a primarily European issue.”216 She 
goes on to add, “Editorials stressed conciliation, not condemnation [of Nasser’s action], 
and avoided all speculation involving military pressure. This stance reflected the view of 
the American public, which was prepared neither to accept oil rationing nor the use of 
force for a faraway canal about which they knew little and which had no apparent impact 
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on their lives.”217 Even though the U.S. government’s refusal to support military action 
against Egypt ultimately wrought disaster onto its closest ally, it, at least, had the 
wholehearted support of the American people.  
After acquiring their respective offices of president and prime minister, 
Eisenhower and Eden desired quite different reputations.  With no need of 
psychoanalysis, there is little doubt this fact contributed to their actions and mindsets 
during the Suez Crisis.  Known quite rightfully as a man of war, after his election to the 
presidency, Eisenhower sought long and hard to transform his persona in the eyes of the 
world to a man of peace.  Setting aside his then secret attempts to bring America into the 
First Indochina War, by 1956 he had achieved this coveted mantle.  Through 
negotiations, he had brought the Korean War to an acceptable stalemate in 1953 and 
during the Geneva Summit in 1955 broke bread with Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin. 
Gearing up for a re-election battle in November, Eisenhower promised to play the role of 
peacemaker for the American public.   As the Suez Crisis broke, with Britain and France 
immediately clambering for war, Eisenhower’s peaceable reputation laid on the line.  If 
he bowed to Eden’s not-so-subtle demands for support for a British invasion of Egypt, 
then it would lay in ruins.  If the president needed any restating of this fact, his press 
secretary gave Eisenhower a friendly reminder on August 6.  In a call to Eisenhower, Jim 
Hagerty argued that the American “people are intensely concerned about Suez . . . and 
that the British (and French) are edging closer to war.”218   He then prompted the 
president about Eisenhower’s recent statement that, “you would go anywhere, anytime, in 
the interests of peace.”219  For the man, one of his long-time aides remembered as “slow 
to pick up the sword,” the message was superfluous; to Eisenhower, and for the sake of 
his reputation, war was not even an option.220                          
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Since taking office in 1955, Anthony Eden sought to prove to himself and the 
British people that he was an apt successor to the great war-time leader Winston 
Churchill.  As American historian Paul Johnson states Eden’s, “first year in power out of 
Churchill’s shadow had been a let-down.  He was criticized, especially in his own party, 
for lacking ‘the smack of firm government.’’’221  As British journalist James Margach 
recounts, “Scarcely had he succeeded Churchill and with astonishing flair won the 1955 
general election than decay set in.  Of all prime ministers’ honeymoons his was the 
briefest.”222  Seen as a weak sister by right-wing members of his own party, by January 
1956, “an ‘Eden Must Go’ campaign was sweeping through the Tory Party.”223  
Ironically much of this anger from the Right came from a perception that Eden, during 
the negotiations of the 1955 Anglo-Egyptian agreement, conceded too much to Nasser.224  
With much of Eden’s career and reputation built on his opposition to Neville 
Chamberlain’s appeasement policy to Hitler, these attacks stung very close to home.  As 
attempts to paint Eden as an appeaser to the “Egyptian Hitler” continued, his popularity 
in the Conservative party waned.  After Nasser had nationalized the Canal, the British 
prime minister saw the impending crisis as the perfect test to show the right wing of his 
party that he had the mettle to meet the challenge.  Diplomacy and talks were not going to 
work, force and military strength stood as the favorable option. 
After Eisenhower’s envoy to the British, Robert Murphy, touched down at 
Heathrow Airport on July 28, things started moving quickly.  Attempting to get a lay of 
the land, Murphy conversed with numerous British officials over the next two days.225  
On orders from Dulles, Murphy instructions were to remind the British that under 
American law, “the President had no authorization to commit military action” and 
“would require Congressional authorization.”226  In two separate meetings on July 29, 
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Murphy, the eyes and ears of the American government, received wildly varying 
accounts on the intentions of the British government towards the crisis.  In an early 
meeting, the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd falsely told him that military force 
stood, “as a last resort.”227  Later in a dinner with his old friend and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Harold Macmillan, Murphy found himself lied to yet again when Macmillan 
gave, “him the impression that our military expedition to Egypt was about to sail.”228  
Searching for explanations for these outright falsehoods told to an American diplomat by 
high British government officials is not complicated.  On the issue of Lloyd’s claim, it 
came from an unequivocal agreement by France to join the British in instrumenting 
Operation Musketeer. After discussions with the French Ambassador, Lloyd discovered, 
“The French were ready to go all the way with us.  They would be prepared to put French 
forces under British command if this was necessary.”229  With this diplomatic 
breakthrough with France, direct American military support was not required for the 
success of Musketeer; hence, Lloyd did not seek it.  Lying to Murphy that military action 
stood as a last resort made sense since the British did not want early American inference 
with their plan. Why Macmillan claimed the direct opposite to Murphy came from 
Macmillan’s distorted view of the Anglo-American relationship, and how he 
independently sought for the crisis to play out.  A committed Americophile, Macmillan 
truly believed if push came to shove, the United States would support military action 
against Egypt by their British ally. Writing in his memoirs Macmillan expressed as much, 
“I was confident that if and when the moment for action arrived we should have, if not 
the overt, at least the covert sympathy and support of the Government and people of the 
United States.”230  Longing to see the two Atlantic powers united as they were during 
World War 2, he refused to comprehend that Anglo-American relations stood at 
loggerheads over Suez.  Naively believing the complete opposite of Lloyd, that the U.S. 
would never seek to interfere with Musketeer, Macmillan attempted to gain immediate 
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American support from Murphy by falsely stating that a British invasion of Egypt was 
imminent.   
If still perplexed where the British stood on military action over the crisis, 
Murphy, after sitting down with the prime minister on July 31, received a better 
indication of how things were progressing. Unlike the earlier cable to Eisenhower, where 
Eden eluded to a possible joint Anglo-American military action against Egypt, the 
Englishman gave no indication that he expected -- or sought -- any direct armed support 
from the United States.  However, like Macmillan, he foresaw no U.S. attempt to impede 
such action.  Writing in his memoir, Murphy recounts that at their meeting:     
There was a confident assumption, however, that the United States would go 
along with anything Britain and France did.  As Eden expressed it, there was no 
thought of asking the United States for anything, ‘be we do hope you will take 
care of the Bear!’  A neat way of saying that Britain and France would take care 
of the Egyptians, but in case of intervention by the Russian Bear, it was 
anticipated that the United States would step in.  It seemed to me that Eden was 
laboring under the impression that a common identity of interest existed among 
the allies.  That was not the American view, and I gave no encouragement to the 
idea. 231          
 
During this conversion with Anthony Eden, all equivocation evaporated in Murphy’s 
mind; he writes, “It became increasingly evident that there was serious and perhaps 
imminent prospect of Anglo-French military action.”232   Attempting to retard any 
intervention, Eisenhower urgently sent John Foster Dulles to London for further talks and 
rapidly drafted a personal message to Eden.233  In the communiqué, the American 
president told the British prime minister, that Murphy had informed him of, “your 
decision to employ force without delay or attempting any immediate and less drastic 
steps.”234   Eisenhower cautioned, “I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my 
conviction that some such method must be attempted before any such action such as you 
contemplate should be undertaken.”235  He goes on to state, “I have given you my own 
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personal conviction . . . as to the unwisdom [sic] even of contemplating military force at 
this moment.”236  The message was clear, yet for Eden not clear enough. 
 To his determent, Eisenhower did not categorically repudiate the non-direct 
support Eden sought from the United States -- such as America checking any Russian 
involvement.  Echoing Murphy, Eisenhower again repeated that without Congressional 
approval he could not send in America forces.  However, the president did not absolutely 
discount the possible need for military action; the phrase “if unfortunately the situation 
can finally resolve only by drastic means” in the message left much wriggle room.237  
Plainly, in Eden’s estimation, Eisenhower wanted a peaceful solution to the crisis, but if 
one proved impossible or maybe just improbable, the American was willing to put the 
option for armed intervention back on the table.  In many respects, the message just 
confirmed the opinion Eden held of the American position already:  that the U.S. would 
not directly intervene militarily, and favored “attempts” at public negotiation before the 
British and French started shooting.  With the meetings with Dulles in London, this 
estimation did not change, but through the American Secretary of State’s blunt language 
only intensified. 
 Although Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles held an adversarial relationship 
for many years, with Dulles arrival to London, the British Empire seemingly found a 
welcomed ally.238  Speaking to U.S. Secretary of State on August 1, Harold Macmillan 
clearly explained that this “game” for the British was not one they could afford to lose 
and, “it was a question not of honour only but of survival.”239 Dulles responded with 
appropriate alarm.  In a meeting with his long-time rival on the same day, the American 
suggested to Eden that an international conference of concern parties meet to discuss the 
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Canal issue.240 For reasons that will become clear, Eden agreed.  Then Dulles expressed 
his forthright opinion on the crisis: 
A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to 
swallow . . . . We must make a genuine effort to bring world opinion to favour the 
international operation of the canal . . . . It should be possible to create a world 
opinion so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated.  Then if a military 
operation had to be undertaken it would be more apt to succeed and have less 
grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately.241  
 
As Eden recalls, “We were encouraged by his statements…Nasser must be made, as Mr. 
Dulles put it to me, ‘to disgorge.’ These were forthright words.  They rang in my ears for 
months.”242  Eden than reported to Dulles: that the United States Naval Attaché desired 
information about British military preparations. The American, as Eden explains, “replied 
that the United States government perfectly well understood the purpose of our 
preparations and he thought that they had a good effect.”243  This pronouncement was just 
more music for the prime minister’s ears.  However, unlike what Eden longed to believe, 
Dulles sincerely expected diplomatic measures to foil Nasser.244  As Dr. Scott Lucas 
argues, “Dulles had not given Eden a blank cheque for military action. He merely restated 
the American position that preferred covert methods to the overt use of force.  However . 
. .  he fostered the illusion that the US would not oppose unilateral British measures.”245  
Hugh Thomas states this type of misunderstanding was purposeful, “Dulles seemed to 
agree with British hatred of Nasser when he was with the British,” however, “in the USA 
he would publicly talk against old-fashioned colonialism.”246   
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 As Dulles returned to Washington, the Anglo-American rift over the Suez had 
both widened and cemented. These facts were woefully unclear to both the British or 
Americans involved.  The fundamental differences between the positions held by Eden’s 
government and the Eisenhower’s administration were now utterly irreconcilable.  
Barring Nasser deciding to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Britain 
remained committed to the use of force.  However, the United States now formally held 
the position that diplomacy through an international consensus was the key to 
“disgorging” the Canal from Nasser’s possession.  Despite the seemingly sympathetic 
words of Dulles to the British, Washington’s approach to using military action against 
Egypt stood diametrically opposed to that of London.  A day before meeting with Eden, 
Dulles stated to the American ambassador to Britain, “The US Government would not be 
in sympathy with any attempt to make the Egyptian Government rescind their 
nationalization decrees, or to regard them inoperative, under the threat of force.”247  Why 
he did not directly relay this to the British government remains a mystery.  For through 
obfuscation and blustering on the part of Dulles, the split between the allies remained 
obscured.  While in the July 31 letter from Eisenhower to Eden, the president counsels 
strongly against military action, this warning is over-shadowed by Dulles’ rhetoric in his 
face-to-face meetings with members of the British government. When selecting which 
message to take to heart, that of a cautious Eisenhower or a winking Dulles, it only takes 
a simple deduction to pick which one Anthony Eden chose to believe -- and which to 
disregard.   
 As agreed by Dulles and Eden steps were soon undertaken for an international 
conference to work toward setting up a practical arrangement of the Suez Canal under a 
transnational structure.   Scheduled for mid-August in London, twenty-four nations were 
invited to participate.  These included the remaining states that initially signed the 1888 
Constantinople Convention -- the official treaty that prior to Nasser’s seizure regulated 
the administration and supervision of the Suez Canal -- in addition to countries that 
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shipped significant cargo through the waterway.248  Heading into this conference, three of 
the principle players of the crisis all welcomed the idea of a forthcoming summit with 
pleasure; each with varying motives but the same intractable reason. Eisenhower, Eden, 
and Nasser all wanted more time. 
 Despite the word games Dulles played with Eden, the prime minister understood 
the United States disapproved of immediate military action by the British against Nasser.  
However since the United Kingdom could not mount an immediate invasion of Egypt, 
this attitude did not initially disturb him.  Preparations for war remained the primary 
objective.  On August 2, Queen Elizabeth signed a royal proclamation recalling reservists 
to active duty.249  By August 5, two Royal Navy aircraft carriers loaded with 4,000 
parachutists and gunners sailed for the Mediterranean.250  While frantic preparations were 
underway for Operation Musketeer, the now joint British-French military staff planning 
the strike still needed time to set up the logistics and infrastructure for the attack.251  
Coordinating and moving the massive amounts of men and equipment for their upcoming 
mission stood as a major hurdle.  The earliest tentative D-day for Musketeer stood as 
September 15.252  In addition to engineering the military end of the operation, Eden also 
found it necessary to bolster political support for his proposed endeavor against Nasser.  
Although initial political and civic support for immediate action to regain the Suez Canal 
was strong across Britain, it did not last.  As Anthony Nutting writes, “The spontaneous 
reaction of anger on the part of the British public, which followed the nationalization of 
the Canal, was now subsiding.”253  By mid-August roughly only 32% of Britons 
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supported military action in Egypt.254  Aware he needed to prepare public opinion to 
accept the initiation of Musketeer, Eden required an interval to accomplish this feat.   
Rightfully believing that Nasser would never participate in a conference held in 
London or be willing to reverse his nationalization of the canal, Eden saw no harm in 
placating the Americans by taking part in a useless conference.  Also by appearing open 
to a diplomatic solution, this allowed the British to claim they took the United States’ 
advice by seeking a peaceful route before engaging in their planned invasion.  Without 
the capability to strike Nasser quickly, it made sense for Eden to pretend to go along with 
the façade that an international symposium could solve the crisis. While all the while, 
British-French forces ceaselessly readied for battle. 
In Cairo and Washington, the hopes were that the lengthier the crisis continued 
without open hostilities, the less chance of them occurring existed.  Nasser supposed that 
the longer he held the Suez Canal then world opinion would eventually come around to 
its new status in the hands of the Egyptians as an accepted fact. In a bid to lessen the 
tensions of forcefully taking control of the Canal, the Egyptian president ordered it to 
remain open to all shipping and, as Eisenhower writes, Nasser promised, “The freedom of 
navigation in the Canal would not be affected.”255  He also started downplaying the part 
America held in his decision to take it.  In a press conference shortly after July 26, Nasser 
maintained that planning for the nationalization of the Suez Canal began long before the 
U.S. refused in aiding the building of the Aswan Dam.256  As Mohamed Heikal states, 
“Nasser was playing for time, trying to mobilize support for Egypt both in Arab countries 
and in the wider world opinion.”257  The Eisenhower Administration, for its part, 
calculated that since Britain had not attacked forthrightly -- as Macmillan and Eden stated 
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the British Empire might -- then cooler heads were prevailing in London as the crisis 
progressed.  In essence, the hastily British were taking the consul of the sage Americans.  
As the commander of French forces during Suez, Andre Beaufre argues, “Eden drew the 
conclusion that, once the conference had assembled, the Americans would support him, 
whereas in fact they were playing for time.”258  Heading into the First London 
Conference, Nasser continued to work on world public opinion, Eden in completing his 
military preparations, and Eisenhower in believing he had made substantial headway with 
the British.  The lit fuse of the crisis continued to burn towards open conflict.  
The First London Conference, launched August 18 and ending on the 23, 
essentially came to naught.  Boycotted by Egypt, the international meeting, in borrowing 
a Shakespearean term, was simply a lot of sound and fury signifying little -- thanks in 
very large part to the United States.  “The conclusion,” as Rab Butler wrote in his 
memoirs, “of the conference agreed to by eighteen of the twenty-two – that an 
international board representing the maritime powers and Egypt should manage the canal 
– had to be taken to Nasser.”259  Headed to lead the delegation to Cairo was the Prime 
Minister of Australia Robert Menzies.260 As historian David Nichols ventures this 
Menzies mission “was almost certain to fail. Why would Nasser, his prestige so enhanced 
by his seizure by his seizure of the Suez Canal, accept an agreement that would 
effectively return authority over its operation to the British and French?”261  It seemed -- 
at least to the British -- that at the very least only a viable and real threat of force could 
potentially achieve this huge capitulation on the part of Nasser.  Nevertheless, the 
conference never broached the explicit threat of force towards Egypt if the nation rejected 
its proposal.  However, still with the diplomatic backing of the eighteen powers of the 
London Conference in addition to the growing concentration of Anglo-French forces at 
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the likely staging area of Cyprus, a pressured Nasser might have agreed to the Menzies’ 
offer.  It was either that or the invasion he knew Anthony Eden truly desired.   Yet the 
words of two prominent Americans totally dashed any slim chance of this nonviolent 
resolution to the crisis from succeeding. 
On August 28, during a press conference, John Foster Dulles, speaking on the 
crisis as a whole remarked, “This is not a matter which is primarily of U.S. concern but 
primarily of concern to the many countries whose economics are vitally dependent on the 
Canal.”262 It stood as a public hand washing by Dulles even Pilate would have envied.  
Speaking to the American press two days after the arrival of the Menzies mission in 
Cairo, Eisenhower completely and unconditionally disallowed any possible use of force if 
Nasser rejected the eighteen-nation plan.  The American president stated that, “For 
ourselves, we are determined to exhaust every possible, every feasible method of 
peaceful settlement . . . We are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, 
nothing else.”   In a message from Eden to Eisenhower on August 29, the British prime 
minister privately rebukes this type of sentiment to the American president by declaring, 
“It is our intention to proceed with our plans unless Nasser can be seen clearly and 
decisively to have given in.”263 However, this firm stance by Eden did not stop 
Eisenhower from uttering only three days later that the Menzies’ mission was in the eyes 
of the United States a toothless dragon.   
Winthrop Aldrich, the then U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain later remarked, 
“Eisenhower cut the bottom right out of the thing by saying publicly, while Menzies was 
down there, that it never had been his intention to have force used at all . . . That was the 
ball game.  It made it impossible for Menzies’ mission to have any success at all.”264  
                                                          
262 Quoted in Menzies, 166. 
263 DDE, Ann Whitman File, International Series Box No. 21, Eden 7-18-56 to 
11-7-56, Folder 2.   
264 Oral history Interview with Winthrop Aldrich, conducted by David Berliner on 
October 16, 1972, Columbia University Oral History Project, located at Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Presidential Library; Rab Butler agrees with Aldrich’s assessment. In his 
memoirs Butler states: “Unfortunately, [Menzies] afterwards complained, the rug was 
pulled clean out from under his feet by President Eisenhower, who chose the very 
moment when Menzies was warning Nasser that the alternative to acceptance could be 
70 
 
Unsurprisingly it did not.  After Menzies arrived for talks with the Egyptian leader on 
September 3, Nasser appeared to have little intention of coming to an equitable 
understanding with the Australian Prime Minister. Stating he would only meet during the 
evenings Nasser said, “Mr. Menzies it looks as if I may have a war on my hands and in 
the morning I must be preparing for it.”265 Nasser, a shrewd strategist, clearly understood 
the direction of the prevailing fury coming from London and Paris.   During this first day 
of talks, Menzies warned Nasser that if he did not comply with the proposal than force 
might have to be used.  However, after the reveal of Eisenhower’s pacifist-like remarks 
of the prior day in the Egyptian newspapers, the tiny chance of a fruitful dialogue went 
squarely out the window.266 As Menzies himself makes clear.  In his autobiography the 
Australian writes, Eisenhower’s statement signaled to Nasser that, “the possibilities of 
force could be ignored, since he would naturally assume that force would not be 
employed against the will of the United States.”267 And as Menzies adds, “he could reject 
our proposals, knowing that if he rejected them quite strongly America would be casting 
about for new proposals which . . . would need to be more favorable to Egypt.”268  As the 
Menzies’ mission departed Cairo on September 9 in utter failure, the British -- still 
determined to force Nasser’s hand -- attempted to play their next card.  Yet again, the 
Americans, not the Egyptians, were the ones to trump it. 
Even before the failure of the Menzies’ mission in early September, the British 
were planning to take their case for Egyptian regime change to the United Nations.269  In 
his August 29 message to Eisenhower, Anthony Eden floated the idea to the American 
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president.270  Looking to legitimize his impending invasion, Eden writes to Eisenhower 
that if Nasser refuses the eighteen-nations proposal then, “the balance of advantage lies in 
our taking the initiative in raising the matter in the Security Council immediately after a 
negative reply from Nasser.”271  Asking for American support for this action, Eden 
continues, “I cannot emphasize too strongly that your active help to the success of this 
plan.”272  Alluding to the actual reason for this measure he writes, “The plan might pay a 
dividend with regard to Nasser’s reactions but the main objective would be to put us in 
the best possible positive internationally in relation to the action we may obliged to 
take.”273  Also with massive amounts of British and French men and arms arriving in 
Cyprus, Eden estimated that a concerned third-party, namely the Soviet Union, would 
raise the issue in the Security Council.  Hence he wanted to beat the communists to the 
punch.  As Eden writes in his memoirs, “The French and ourselves were determined that 
an appeal to the United Nations must be firmly based on the two conditions.”274  The first 
that no agreement be accepted by the U.S., France, and the U.K. short of the eighteen-
power proposal and second, “that together we should resist any move by less friendly 
powers to limit our freedom of action.”275  If an Anglo-French plan along these stated 
lines passed into a U.N. Security Council resolution, it granted Eden an official stamp of 
approval in taking out Nasser with force.  The Americans saw this as a tipping point.  If 
such a resolution came to a decision of the Security Council then in front of the entire 
world, it would force the U.S. to declare publicly on whose side they stood; either with 
their trusted ally or an upstart dictator.  That stood as a decision Eisenhower wanted to 
prolong as long as he could. 
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While the Americans dragged their feet about the prospect of the British and 
French taking their case to the United Nations, Dulles hatched a plan later entitled the 
Suez Canal Users Association or SCUA.276  Journalist Donald Neff writes, “While Eden 
and Mollet searched desperately for an internationally acceptable pretext to go to war 
with Egypt, Dulles applied all his formidable energies and legal prestidigitation to 
sidetrack them.”277  SCUA, a proposed international body to govern the Canal alongside 
Egypt, was for Dulles and Eisenhower a means to restraint the British and French from 
both arguing their side to the United Nations and also from preceding to invade Egypt -- 
the real goal of the two European powers.  Historian Huge Thomas calls this planned 
Users’ Association, “Dulles’s (sic) most masterly scheme of evasion.”278 While Eden and 
the French Prime Minister Mollet Guy had their doubts about it accomplishing anything, 
they had their own reasons for going along with talks over SCUA.  
As the deadline loomed for the September 15, the launch date of Musketeer, the 
time frame of the planned operation looked more and more unfavorable to the British.  As 
world public opinion settled, Eden now believed that a pretext, more than just the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, was required for his planned invasion of Egypt to seem 
somewhat justified in the eyes of the international community.  Since July 26, Nasser had 
allowed all French and British shipping through the Canal and even tolerated these 
vessels refusal to pay their tolls to the Egyptian government -- the two nations, in an act 
of defiance, continued to make payments for their usage of the waterway to the old Suez 
Company.279 Also instead of flatly refusing to meet the Mezines mission, Nasser 
graciously listened to their proposals and at least seemed amenable to a peaceful solution.  
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These signs of reasonable action were not the kind that Britain and France found useful 
when attempting to paint Nasser as a new Hitler or Mussolini.  A more clear-cut casus 
belli for the British, if not the French, who were uncaring on the subject of world opinion, 
needed finding.  Ever wise to the fact Nasser stated, “The British and French are going to 
stay out there in the Mediterranean until they find a pretext to come in.”280   
Furthermore, the objectives and logistics of Musketeer remained problems for the 
September 15 timetable.  Initially planned as an all-out attack on Egypt, the preliminary 
directive called for a landing at Alexandria.281  Philip Ziegler writes this strategy, “made 
it inevitable that an armed amphibious assault in a densely populated area would be 
preceded by massive bombardment by sea and air.”282  With such a substantial attack, the 
civilian casualty rate stood to rank in the thousands or possibly in the tens of 
thousands.283  Even the military leadership balked at these figures, “As the details were 
worked out, the planners themselves became more and more aghast at what they were 
proposing.”284  On the behest of the Commander-in-Chief of Middle Eastern Land 
Forces, General Charles Knightley, who the British government charged to lead the 
attack against Egypt, the original plan for Musketeer was ordered restructured.285  In this 
revised attack-plan, the landing for the assault changed from Alexandria to Port Said with 
the retaking of the Suez Canal as the now initial objective.286  However, the marching 
orders of “Musketeer Revise” still held after the securing of the Canal Zone the Anglo-
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French forces redirecting their attack towards Cairo with the ultimate goal of ousting 
Nasser.  
By mid-September to the chagrin of the Conservative Government, the glorious 
armed forces of the British Empire were still unprepared to tackle the Egyptian armies of 
Gamal Nasser.  Having less to do with the combat-readiness of the British fighting men, 
the problem laid in the still nagging one of logistics.   The June abandonment of the 
massive complex of military bases in the Canal Zone left Eden to stage his upcoming 
invasion of Egypt from the island of Cyprus.  However due to inadequate airfields and 
harbors on the island in mid-September the RAF and the Royal Navy forces were divided 
between there and Malta.  Extensive refitting of these facilities were still underway by 
mid-September.  Keightley and Mountbatten needed more time in order to finish these 
improvements so they could muster their forces for a necessary coordinated attack.  From 
early September on, Eden, on the counsel of both his political and military advisors, kept 
pushing the date for Musketeer, and later Musketeer Revise, back.  With the buildup of 
the Anglo-French military forces in the Mediterranean evident to both his domestic and 
foreign critics, Eden soon faced an undesirable choice.  He needed to order the invasion, 
ready or not, or call the whole thing off.  The presence of mounting internal and external 
political pressure and the racketing of tensions caused by the gathering of such a large 
armed force demanded that current situation could not go on indefinitely.  Backed into a 
corner, Eden found himself in a precarious position. If he refused to attack Egypt and 
through negotiations backed by the Americans, Nasser held onto to the Canal then Eden’s 
government was certain to fall.  Historian Jonathan Pearson writes, “By the 13 
September, Eden found himself under intense pressure both from the opposition and from 
a split in his own party.”287   Now war or the return of the Suez Canal stood as the only 
options.  With Nasser standing firm on retaining his prize, the British prime minister 
badly needed a pretext for his invasion -- time, once his welcomed friend, now ticking 
against him. 
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 On September 14 the European pilots who steered the ship through the 120-mile 
length of the Suez Canal collectively walked off the job.288  Due to the complex and 
challenging nature of circumventing the Canal, trained navigators needed to helm the 
boats on their journey through it.  Prior to July 1956, few Egyptian nationals held this 
occupation and the vast majority of these pilots were either French or British.  After 
nationalization of the Canal, through the combination of the necessity to kept the seaway 
open and the refusal of Nasser to let these men quit, these Europeans had stayed at their 
post.  But on orders of Eden to the Suez Canal Company, this all changed.  Believing that 
the Egyptians were incapable of the difficult task of navigating the waterway, he 
concluded without the assistance of the mostly British and French pilots then shipping 
would ground to a halt through the channel.  With the Suez Canal inoperable the precious 
supply of Middle Eastern oil had no way of reaching Western Europe.  Just the excuse for 
the British to retake the Canal for the common good of Europe; it was a pretext that even 
the U.S. might find acceptable.  However, this latest venture by Eden failed and even 
backfired.289  Nasser, who wisely foresaw this potential British provocation, had been 
busy ordering the training of Egyptian pilots just for this eventuality.  In most cases, they 
filled the positions of the departing Europeans without a hitch.290  To the fury and 
wonderment of Eden and Mollet, the Canal remained open, and its productivity and 
efficiency even increased.291  This episode showed to the world that despite British and 
French protests the Suez Canal laid in capable hands with Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
 On September 19 a second London Conference convened consisting of the 
eighteen nations that signed off on the Menzies mission.  The creation of the so-called 
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Suez Canal Users’ Association was the agenda of the meeting.  The intention of SCUA, 
at least in the selling of it to the British by the Americans, was to form an international 
organization to manage the Canal by hiring its pilots and collecting its tolls. Otherwise, as 
Eden viewed it, “to convoy ships of its members through the canal if the Egyptians 
refused or proved unable to do so.”292 However, as agreed by almost everyone involved 
in the crisis through hindsight, it had a more clandestine raison d'etre in the mind of it 
actually creator, Dulles.  Eden’s optimistic attitude on the potential usefulness of SCUA 
did not last long. 
 Even before the gathering of its participants, Dulles cut the floor directly from 
under SCUA.  On September 13, during a press conference the American secretary of 
state declared that in the view of the United States the forthcoming User’s Association 
had no authority to use military force against Egypt if Nasser did not comply with the 
terms of its arrangement.293  He further added that the organization was strictly a 
volunteer body that could not require its individual members to follow SCUA’s 
mandates.294  These utterings by the American left SCUA as nothing more than a paper 
tiger.  The credit for why the British ever agreed to host or participate in a conference 
setting up such a meaningless association must go directly to Dulles. Although the 
American actually thought up the notion of SCUA, Dulles nevertheless convinced Eden 
to announce it to the world as a British proposal.  Still tendered to the idea after the 
Americans categorically refused to support its rulings with military force, the U.K. had 
no choice but to follow through with the Second London Conference and hope for the 
best.  By the first days of the meetings, it appeared they were expecting too much.  
Remarking on this merited frustration, Anthony Eden writes, “It became clear to us only 
gradually that the American conception of the association was now evolving so fast that it 
would end as an agency for collecting dues for Nasser.”295  Anthony Nutting described 
the United States’ position of a voluntary nature for SCUA as meaning, “the User’s Club 
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would do no more than crystallize the status quo and would not be empowered to bring 
any further pressure on Egypt.”296  To Eden and his Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd it 
became obvious the route envisioned by Dulles for SCUA was a ruse from stopping the 
British and French from acting in their best interests (i.e. invading Egypt).  The 
conference ended on September 21, with nothing accomplished except scheduling yet 
another conference for October 1, for the opening of the now christened Suez Canal 
Users Association.  Sick and tired of Dulles’ time-wasting maneuvers and in 
contradiction of the wishes of the United States, the British and French petitioned their 
case against Egypt to the United Nations Security Council on September 23.297  True to 
form, Eisenhower refused to sponsor the proposed resolution, leaving the Eden and 
Mollet to go it alone. 
 On October 13, after ten days of discussions on the issue, the Security Council, 
through the veto of the Soviet representative, rejected any direct action against Egypt 
under a United Nation’s banner.298  “There was no on in that room at the United 
Nations,” Eden states, “at the conclusion of the vote, who supposed for an instant that any 
life was left in the work of the London Conference.”299  The countless hours spent in both 
international conferences and meetings at the United Nations garnered nothing for Eden 
in his duel against Nasser.  Time for action was at hand, and with the Americans 
steadfastly refusing to do anything but delay, the British opened to an intriguing offer 
made by the French. 
Unlike the United States, Great Britain found a faithful ally during the crisis in the 
nation of France.  Reminiscent of the world wars, the Anglo-French alliance stood 
throughout the events of 1956 cemented in stone.   With no vacillating, the French rallied 
from the start to the cause of their European neighbor.   Andre Beaufre, the commander 
of the French expeditionary forces for Suez, recounts, “As early as 31 July Colonel Prieur 
of the Army Staff went to London to announce the colour of the French money: France 
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was ready to commit two divisions to Egypt.”300  Only just a day before Prieur’s offer the 
country’s Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, matched any of bellicose rhetoric originating from 
the other side of the English Channel.  Labeling Nasser a “would-be dictator,” Mollet 
decried the Egyptian leader as a Hitler imitator.301  Alongside their British allies, the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal stood as an intolerable act for the French 
government.302  Just as with Britain, the economic consequences of the potential closure 
of the waterway would leave France in dire straits.  For the nation, the access of Middle 
Eastern oil was a vital necessity.  Although state prestige and concern for its perception 
as a world power mattered to the Mollet government, it never factored into their decisions 
during the crisis as much as it did to the British.  However, another dynamic urgently 
pushed France for the overthrow of Nasser.   
Mired in a bloody guerrilla war against Arab nationalists in Algeria since 1954, 
the French believed that a direct link existed between this conflict and the Suez Crisis.303  
Considered by many French citizens not simply as an overseas colony but an actual 
providence of France, Algeria stood as a test of the will of the nation.   The red, white and 
blue tricolor had flown over the Northern African territory since 1830, but by 1956, the 
cities and towns of the region were erupting into full-fledged warzones in a bid to tear it 
down.  Unlike the retreat from Indochina in 1954, the battle to hold on to Algeria -- 
where over one million Pied-Noirs (French-descendent inhabitants) were fighting for 
their homes and businesses -- was to the French very personal.304  Much of the finger 
pointing from Paris for the unrest and violence in this North African providence pointed 
towards Cairo.  Mollet considered Nasser as the number one instigator and prime 
supporter for this nationalist insurrection speared headed by a group calling themselves 
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the National Liberation Front (FNL).305  As Diane Kunz states, “By striking at Nasser 
would deny the FLN material support and would help assuage the growing feeling of 
impotence engendered by the peculiarly destructive nature of guerrilla war.”306  With 
Nasser deposed the French government could cut off Egyptian backing towards the Arab 
nationalists within its own borders.  Arguing this point, the Resident Minister in Algeria 
stated, “One French division in Egypt is worth four divisions in North Africa.”307  As 
with Eden, Mollet viewed the crisis as more to do than just the control of the Suez Canal; 
the Frenchman saw an opportunity to rid his citizens of the most vocal and active 
international champion for Algerian independence -- Gamal  Abdel Nasser.308  By mid-
October, through the stringent urgings of the powers-that-be in Paris, France brought 
another interested party into Eden’s anti-Nasser coalition, one that radically altered the 
entire dynamic of the Suez Crisis.  
France not bound to any so-called special relationship cared quite a bit less in 
placating the U.S. or attempting to garner American support during the crisis than its 
British ally.  As early as July 31, after Robert Murphy in London refused to support 
armed intervention, Mollet already began feeling the sense that America had abandoned 
France.309  Even at that early of a date, a covert meeting had taking place with another 
close ally, who the French trusted not to shrink from what needed doing.  Unbeknownst 
to either the British or the Americans, French military officials on July 29 had initiated 
contingency planning with Israel for a possible joint attack against Egypt.310  A long-time 
supplier of arms to Israel, by 1956 France considered the Jewish state one of its closest 
allies.  The same about Israel could not be said concerning the United Kingdom.  Only 
eight years prior, the British Empire fought a bloody guerrilla war against the same men 
who now governed Israel.  In addition, Anthony Eden -- despite his troubled dealings in 
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the Middle East -- considered himself an Arabist and believed his nation’s duty remained 
to lead, if not rule, the Arab world.  His adamant backing in forming the Baghdad Pact is 
a perfect example of this sentiment.  During the crisis the British kept Israel 
diplomatically shut off from any involvement in dread of negative Arab reaction such 
participation would engender.311  However, numerous times between July and September 
both Mollet and the French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau prodded the British to 
include Israel in their war planning for Operation Musketeer.312  Fearing how this 
involvement would appear to both the Americans and the rest of the world, Eden 
categorically refused such a provocative measure.  Nevertheless, by the middle of 
October, with the unaltered political climate and the desperate need to act least every fell 
apart, the British prime minister opened to the idea of a covert arrangement with the 
Israelis.  With the once wartime ally, Eisenhower, refusing to support him, Eden turned to 
a former enemy of the British Empire for assistance.313   
On October 21, Eden ordered Selwyn Lloyd to undertake a secret meeting on 
behalf of the British Government.  The next day Lloyd, “announced that he had a heavy 
cold and cancelled his existing appointments.”314  Arriving by plane in France, as 
described by a companion of Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister was shuffled into a 
private home in Sèvres where the French and Israelis were already discussing future 
plans.315 In this French villa, the Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion and Mollet 
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called on Lloyd to help end the Suez Affair once and for all.316  On direct orders from 
Eden, the Englishman readily agreed.  The new plan organized by the three nations at 
Sèvres held for the Israelis to attack Egypt across their shared border and menacingly 
move towards the Suez Canal.  After this initial outbreak of hostilities, British and French 
military forces, in the ironic guise of peacemakers, were to land -- just as proposed in 
Operation Musketeer Revise -- at Port Said and seize the Canal for its “protection.”317  
Eden demanded only two concessions from Ben-Gurion and Mollet to his agreement with 
this strategy.  One, for the Israelis to hit the Egyptians hard -- not to hold back -- and two, 
that the appearance of the Anglo-French attack against Egypt kept, by any means, to look 
as an interdiction to separate the already warring parties.318  If these conditions could be 
met, then Eden believed he had finally found the right pretext for the war he so longingly 
sought.319  Unbeknownst to the rest of the world, on October 24 a top-secret document 
entitled the Protocols of Sèvres -- signed by French foreign minister Christian Pineau, 
Ben-Gurion, and Patrick Dean, an Assistant Under-Secretary at the British Foreign Office 
-- formalized the collision on the part of the three nations in jointly attacking Egypt.320   
On October 17, just prior to the secret meeting of Sèvres, Britain, now formally 
committed to a tacit alliance with France and Israel in invading Egypt, stopped all 
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attempts to influence the United States Government over the Suez Crisis.321  Since 
receiving a strongly worded message from Eisenhower on September 3, Eden essentially 
understood the United States rejected the use of force against Nasser.322  Yet in Anthony 
Nutting’s estimation the more Eisenhower warned Eden: “that America and world 
opinion would not support him . . . Eden became to conceal his hand from the Americans.  
And after the decision to gang up with Israel had been taken, Eisenhower was told 
nothing at all.”323  The America president states by late-October, “It looked like the 
British had given up . . . . We couldn’t figure out exactly what was happening because, as 
I say, finally all communications just ceased between us on the one hand, and the French 
and the British on the other.”324 Dulles, in a meeting with his staff, also showed 
concerned over this abrupt change noting, “It’s very strange that we have heard nothing 
whatever from the British for ten days.  We must try to find out what they and the French 
are up to.”325  For the first time since the formation of the crisis, Dulles and Eisenhower 
were totally out of the loop in regards to the pending actions of their British allies.  
Although American intelligence reported increased mobilization by the Israelis military, 
the U.S. could not decipher which neighbor of the Jewish state these bellicose actions 
were intended for -- Jordan, Syria, or Egypt.326  Totally in the dark, the Eisenhower 
Administration, in the throes of a presidential election battle and worried by a brewing 
crisis in Hungary, hoped for the best. 
Also hoping for the best in the fading days of October 1956 was Anthony Eden.  
Although much criticism had since been lobed at him for deciding to take the path of 
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“collusion,” by that time Eden held very few cards left to play.  While some historians, 
like Johanthan Pearson in his book Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant 
Gamble (2003), argue Eden folded to intense pressure from the French to conspire with 
their Israeli allies, it is hard to conceive that it took a lot of arm squeezing to get the 
British Prime Minister to join in an alliance against his arch-enemy Nasser.  Having 
exhausted all attempts to earn American support for military action, he needed a 
resolution that excluded the direct involvement of the United States.  With tens of 
thousands of British servicemen overseas anxiously waiting for the word to attack, and a 
political situation deteriorating daily, Eden’s creditability and political survival stood on 
the line.  If he withdrew the British military without any meaningful concessions from 
Nasser, Eden’s government would undoubtedly fall.  And if the numerous conferences, 
meetings, and diplomatic missions proved anything it was Nasser persisted in steadfastly 
keeping the Canal unless forced to disgorge it.  With the refusal of Eisenhower even to 
seriously contemplate meaningful economic sanctions or the use of force, the situation 
became an effective stalemate.  Each side were sticking to their guns, but only Nasser’s, 
through his holding of the Canal, were loaded.  Unlike at the beginning of the Suez 
Crisis, when time seemed firmly on the British side, now, with Dulles numerous delaying 
tactics taking their toll, it was quickly running out.  Collusion, as the critics of the 
Protocols of Sèvres have called it, stood for Eden as a way out of all of this malaise.  
However, there remained an all-important caveat to this track; American support 
of a substantial amount had to materialize for Britain to achieve its goals in this risky 
endeavor.    While certainly Eisenhower, and to a lesser degree Dulles, denounced any 
attempt for Britain to resolve the Suez Crisis by armed intervention, to what extent were 
they serious remained in Eden’s estimation debatable.  Once bullets started flying how 
could the United States abandon one of its closest allies.  In effect all the British needed 
was the tacit backing of their Atlantic partner -- not direct military assistance   Support in 
the United Nations, help with keeping the Soviets at bay, and most importantly access to 
North American oil if the Canal became inoperable.  All critical needs to the British, but 
only limited liabilities to the Americans.  Heading into the last week of October, Eden 
gambled that when push came to shove the United States -- while unhappy about being 
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placed in such a precarious position -- would ultimately support their English-speaking 
cousins. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
A VERY BRITISH GAMBIT 
(October 29 – December 22) 
 
 
“The British Cabinet certainly made a profound miscalculation as to the likely reaction in 
Washington to the Franco-British intervention.”327 
-Harold Macmillan from his memoirs 
 
“Those who began this operation [the British and the French] should be left . . . to boil in 
their own oil.”328 
-Dwight Eisenhower remarking on the unfolding crisis on October 30, 1956 
 
On October 29, 1956, to quote the words of poet John Milton, all hell broke loose.  
As according to plan, David Ben-Gurion commenced Operation Kadesh -- an aggregated 
invasion of the Sinai Peninsula.329  Under the cover of nightfall, aircraft of the Israel 
Defense Force (IDF) dropped an airborne brigade near the strategic Mitla Pass, only 31 
miles from the Suez Canal.330  As the vanguard of paratroopers, “were digging in on the 
Mitla heights, two armoured columns crossed the frontier and started their dash across the 
desert, sweeping aside the small Egyptian detachments in their path.”331  Initially the 
motive for the Israeli attack was a complete mystery to Nasser and his closest advisors.  
The IDF forces racing across in a mad sprint towards the Suez made no sense to the 
Egyptian military staff; it left the Israelis open to both aerial bombardment and a cutting 
off of their lengthening supply lines.  Oddly, Nasser assumed that “the only plausible 
explanation offered was that Israel now believed Britain and France to be on the point of 
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reaching a settlement with Egypt, so the crisis was over, and a frustrated Israel was trying 
to settle its own private scores with Egypt in a hurry.”332 By mid-morning on Tuesday, 
October 30, the erroneousness of this scenario dissipated when reports reached Nasser of 
RAF reconnaissance aircraft spotted over the Suez Canal.333  The astute Egyptian 
president now fully recognized the prearrangement of the situation. 
As news reached America of the Israeli invasion -- unlike the bewilderment of the 
Egyptian government -- the first thoughts of both Dulles and Eisenhower turned to 
possible involvement by Britain and France.  On first hearing of the attack, Dulles in an 
effort to “smoke them out and see where they stand” called for an audience of the British 
and French ambassadors.334  Conspicuously neither was available for consultations.   In a 
meeting later that day with the president, Dulles stated that the U.S., “must expect British 
and French intervention.  In fact, they appear to be ready for it and may even have 
concerted their action with the Israelis.”335  Writing in Waging Peace (1960), Eisenhower 
notes, “Some at the meeting speculated that the British and French might be counting on 
the hope that when the chips are down, the United States would have to go along with 
them, however much we disapproved.336  Then he chilly adds, “But we did not consider 
that course.”337  By the evening of the 29, Eisenhower decided that the best recourse for 
the United States was to introduce a resolution in the United Nations condemning the 
Israeli attack and calling them to withdrawal immediately from Egyptian territory. In a 
meeting that night between Henry Cabinet Lodge, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., and 
his British counterpart, Pierce Dixon, the Americans received their first true indication on 
how the government of the United Kingdom stood on the evolving situation.  Eisenhower 
in a telegram to Eden dated October 30 recounts the event.  As Eisenhower writes, Lodge 
requested Dixon to support the upcoming American resolution in the United Nations 
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denouncing Israel’s aggression in the Middle East.338   On Dixon’s reaction, Eisenhower 
tells Eden, “We were astounded to find that he was completely unsympathetic, stating 
frankly his Government would not agree any action whatsoever to be taken against 
Israel.”339      
The next day Eisenhower received a message from Eden expressing no desire to 
aid Nasser against Israel and stating Egypt had brought the attack upon itself.340  He 
further went on to state, “we cannot afford to see the Canal closed or to lose the shipping 
which is on daily passage through it . . . . We feel decisive action should be taken at once 
to stop the hostilities.”341 Ending the communiqué the prime minister stated he would 
write again that day after meeting with Guy Mollet and Christian Pineau.  By mid-
morning Lodge had introduced the resolution calling for Israel to withdraw its troop from 
Egyptian soil to the U.N. Security Council.342 In historic firsts, Britain and France 
exercised their veto power against the resolution; then again, when the Soviet Union 
introduced a resolution along the same lines.343  Although the vetoes caused an uproar 
among the assembled diplomats, to Eden and Mollet, who failed to gain the international 
organization’s support earlier in the month, it must have felt like appropriate payback.  
Regardless the two men, sans the U.N., were busy issuing their own highly controversial 
resolution the very same day. 
As agreed upon during the clandestine meeting at Sèvres, the Britain and France 
formally interceded into the fray.  On October 30, at 4:30 P.M. Eden while addressing the 
House of Common announced the issuing of an ultimatum ostensibly directed at both 
Israel and Egypt.344  It demanded the two nations ceased military action, withdraw their 
forces at least ten miles away from the Suez Canal and allow the occupation of the Canal 
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Zone by Anglo-French forces, or face immediate attack by Britain and France.345  He 
gave a deadline of 12 hours for compliance with his mandate.  Eden stated the motive for 
these measures “was to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit 
through the canal by the ships of all nations.”346  However, the mechanics and wording of 
the ultimatum gave little doubt of its true intention.  With only Egyptian forces in a ten-
mile radius of the Canal and Nasser still controlling the waterway, the Anglo-French 
threat for noncompliance only applied to Egypt.   For these reasons, the role of impartial 
peacekeepers on the part Eden and Mollet found few credulous believers anywhere in the 
world.  Nevertheless, both premiers formally received the backing of their respective 
legislative assemblies shortly after the announcement of their ultimatum; in the British 
Commons Eden received 270 votes to 218, and in the French National Assembly Mollet 
garnered a majority of 368 to 182.347   With the die cast, now the only thing left was for 
the British to inform their most crucial, yet unapprised, ally -- the Americans. 
Fearing U.S. attempts to halt the issuing of the Anglo-French ultimatum, Eden did 
not inform Eisenhower until he had already officially announced it to the world.  As 
promised in an earlier telegram that day, the British prime minister cabled Eisenhower 
after his speech to the Commons.  In it, he outlined the demands he had already issued 
and attempted to excuse his decision in leaving the Americans in the dark on this 
action.348  Eden closed with hopes that “after the dust settles there may well be a chance 
for our doing a really constructive piece of work together.”  Reception of the news of the 
two-power ultimatum at the White House was anything but welcoming.  Dulles, speaking 
to Eisenhower, called it about as “cruel and brutal” demand as he had ever 
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encountered.349   The president seethed to an aide, “I’ve just never seen great powers 
make such a complete mess and botch of things!”350  Eisenhower fired off a new telegram 
to Eden, which the president later categorized as a warning.351  Writing on the current 
situation he stated to Eden, “I must urgently express to you my deep concern at the 
prospect of this drastic action” and “that peaceful processes can and should prevail to 
secure a solution.”352  Clearly, the British prime minister did not comprehend the warning 
or just disregarded it.  Eden cabled back to Eisenhower later that night his desire to use 
parts of the president’s message to justify the British Government’s position in the 
ongoing debate over it in the House of Commons.353  To Eisenhower it was almost too 
much to comprehend; he fired off a response telling Eden to do, as he liked.  Clearly it 
would take more than interpersonal messages between head of states to halt the British 
from the widening the war.   
At dusk the next day, October 31, British aircraft appeared over Cairo.  They 
delivered with fury the wrath of an Empire finally seeking it revenge.  Bombs dropping 
across the Egyptian capital specifically targeted airfields and the Egyptian air force.354  
The RAF then turned to knocking out Radio Cairo and dropping millions of leaflets 
blaming the Egyptian population in putting their faith in the hands of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser.355  These latter planned psychological attacks put the Britain’s role as unbiased 
arbiter in jeopardy, but by then it became less of a priority.  The immediate goals of 
taking out Nasser and regaining the Suez Canal took precedence over maintaining the 
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now highly dubious pretext for these actions.  With other coordinated attacks on the 
Egyptian airbases throughout the nation, Britain and France soon gained air superiority 
over most of the country.  By November 1, as the Anglo-French armada rode anchor off 
the islands of Crete and Malta, invasion loomed close.  In preparations for hostile 
landings, Nasser desperately ordered the bulk of the Egyptian army to withdraw from the 
Sinai in order to protect Cairo and instructed the workers of the Suez Canal to prepare for 
guerrilla warfare.  It seemed certain to him and the rest of the world, nothing was 
stopping the British and French from an all-out invasion of his homeland.  However, as 
the French, Israeli, and British battled the Egyptians, another war flared between Britain 
and America.  This conflict -- fought out in the trenches of the United Nations, finical 
corridors of power, and boiling over to the high seas -- was the one that ultimately saved 
the Egyptian dictator from the hands of his embittered enemies. 
On the first of November, in a bid to stymie their headstrong allies, the Americans 
struck back.  In a televised speech, Eisenhower addressed the nation, and the world, over 
the Anglo-French bombardment.  On air the president made clear, “The United States 
was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions.  Nor were we informed of 
them in advance.356  Distancing the U.S. further from its European allies he added, “As it 
is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is 
likewise our right, if our judgment so dictates, to dissent.  We believe these actions to 
have been taking in error.”357 The message was clear to all; Britain and France had acted 
alone with no covert or tactic backing by the United States.  To cement this fact, the U.S. 
again went to the United Nations.   
Circumventing the Security Council, where the definite vetoes of Britain and 
France terminated any hope of progress, Eisenhower directed Ambassador Lodge to take 
the U.S. case for an immediate cease-fire to the General Assembly.  Fearful that any 
inaction might cause ruin to the foreign policy of the United States, Dulles summed up 
the need to press the issue: 
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If we are not now prepared to assert our leadership in this cause, then leadership 
will certainly be seized by the Soviet Union . . . . For many years now the United 
States had been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and 
valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand and on the 
other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly 
independent countries who have escaped colonialism.  Unless we now assert and 
maintain this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from 
us to the U.S.S.R. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French 
colonialist policies.358 
 
As Eden attests, here the Americans succeeded, he writes, “It was not Soviet Russia, or 
any Arab state, but the Government of the United States which took the lead in [the 
General] Assembly against Israel, France, and Britain.”359  As an emergency session of 
the General Assembly convening at 5:00 P.M. on November 1, the cards were clearly 
stacked against the British and their allies.  In a marathon like Assembly meeting that 
lasted twelve continuous hours, finally ending at 4 A.M. the next morning, the British and 
French delegates were exposed to almost universal censure and blinding criticism.360  As 
Eden described it, “The Assembly was in a mood to punish.  The hunt was up after Israel 
and the ‘colonial’ powers.”361  Now with the complete absence of any convivial talk 
about “disgorging” the Canal from Nasser, Dulles, himself, introduced the resolution 
calling on the British to end their anti-Egyptian crusade.  The final count had 64 countries 
voting for the American resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and only five 
rejecting it; these were Britain, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand.362   The vote 
was devastating to the United Kingdom’s position on the world’s stage.363  Although the 
Assembly resolution, unlike a Security Council motion, did not have the weight of an 
order, its effectively labeled Britain, alongside France and Israel, as international pariahs 
flaunting the established rule of law.   
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 At dawn on November 2, Anthony Eden found himself in a perilous position.  
Since the issuing of the two-power ultimatum and the ensuing air campaign, domestic 
disapproval had sharply increased for his government’s policies. By then opinion polls 
showed only 37 percent of the British public supported his decision to “take military 
action in Egypt.”364  Only two days earlier, on October 31, Eden received the resignation 
of his political protégé, Anthony Nutting.  Refusing to go along with what he termed 
collusion, Nutting effectively gave up his political career to protest Eden’s decision to 
join Britain’s lot with France and Israel.365  When accepting Nutting’s notice, the prime 
minister optimistically concluded the meeting by saying: “I hope, in spite of all this, that 
we shall see something of each other in the future.”366  After the meeting, they never saw 
each other again.367  Moreover, in Parliament the tide against intervention in the conflict 
continued to rise.  Although Eden had substantially won the vote for his ultimatum in the 
House of Commons, the divisions for and against fell directly down party lines. Without 
the support of Labour the resulting vote, “showed conclusively that Britain was launching 
its military action against the expressed desires of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.”368  
The now escalating international opposition, spurred on by the United States, only 
worsened Eden’s home front troubles.  Adding to these difficulties were also multiplying 
concerns originating from Britain’s two allies, France and Israel.     
Fearing theses mounting pressures might soon break the will of the British to 
continue with the agreed upon plan, the French starting baiting their English allies to 
launch their invasion forces for Egypt post haste.  Beginning with the bombing of Cairo, 
Mollet and Pineau lobbied for an immediate follow-up with the landing of their 
respective ground troops.  The Frenchmen argued if the Anglo-French forces would 
coordinate with the Israeli military then a quick and safe landing at Port Said could be 
assured.  If the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) crossed the Suez and hammered the 
Egyptians then Operation Musketeer Revised would assuredly succeed.  Eden, fearful of 
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the charge of collusion with Israel, refused any attempt to synchronize the two allied 
forces.  As Keith Kyle states, “France, from the beginning, was engaged in a fighting a 
different war from Britain.”369   While Britannia was, “inhibited by her Commonwealth 
ties, her ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and that regard for appearances 
which both her domestic politics and her record at the UN required,” France only desired 
to destroy Nasser and aid their ally Israel caring little in pretexts and perceptions.370  
Without the direct aid of Israel in the forthcoming landing, launching immediately after 
the start of the air campaign stood as a risky proposition.   
Once Nasser understood the three-power dynamic of the attack against him, he 
had ordered the Egyptian army to the west side of the Suez Canal, the side British and 
French sought to land and then fight towards to Cairo.371  Also, with negotiations in the 
General Assembly reaching a fever-pitch on November 1 and 2, the idea had been batted 
around that a United Nations peacekeeping force should intercede in the ongoing conflict.  
The British believed that their yet unengaged ground troops could take up that banner if 
the premeditated invasion fell apart.  After the debacle during the fight over the ceasefire 
resolution at the United Nations, Eden rightfully held doubts that the original secret 
Sèvres scenario remained workable.  Although still committed to landings at Port Said, 
the British sought cover for their invasion; but the French were still not entirely 
convinced.  They saw capitulation in the ranks.  Speaking of Eden, Pineau remarked he 
“is no Churchill.  He has neither the tenacity nor the steel of nerves.  The test, instead of 
strengthening him, exhausts him.  It is not yet a ‘breakdown,’ but we are not far from 
it.”372 This coming breakdown originated from attempting to please everyone and 
pleasing no one.  No matter how much talking, explaining, or pleading with Eisenhower 
and Dulles these Americans were standing firm: no military solution from the outset and 
now since the bombing campaign only an immediate ceasefire.  Bound by honor to the 
Sèvres agreement and his own convictions, Eden refused to shift in accepting these 
demands.  Finally, bowing to French pressure, the British set a date for the D-day of the 
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invasion.  On November 5, gunpowder and plot -- albeit not treason -- were finally 
coming to fruition. 
On November 4, in the ongoing mêlée to halt the war, another resolution passed 
the General Assembly calling for the U.N. to introduce a police force into the Middle 
East within forty-eight hours.  It passed in a 55-0 vote.  The American supported 
resolution, “established a United Nations command for an emergency international force 
to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.”373  Despite this occurrence, in 
Downing Street the British prime minister held firm.  Now resolved to the landing of 
forces, Eden was determined to play out his gambit to the hilt.  British and French ships 
loaded with men and instruments of war steamed toward the Sinai Peninsula.  This 
armada found an unlikely opponent on the way to its destination.  See Figure Two. 
 
 
Figure Two:  Political Cartoon by Michael Cummings printed in The Daily Express on 
May 26, 1957.374 
Source: "1957 - The U.S. Sixth Fleet dashes off to -er - ahem - intervene in the Middle 
East..." Digital image. A Cartoon History of the Middle East. Accessed April 9, 2016. 
http://www.mideastcartoonhistory.com  
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Right from the beginning of the Suez affair, only one institution in the American 
government unwaveringly supported the aims, means, and ways of Great Britain in its 
efforts towards solving the crisis. Unlike the politicians they served and advised, the 
leadership of the United States military stridently wanted the British to succeed.  In a 
memorandum of July 31 to the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommended that if necessary to regaining “the Suez Canal under a friendly and 
responsible authority” the U.S. should take military action in support of Britain.375  Also 
on the same day, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke declared in a 
National Security Council meeting that, “the JCS are of the view that Nasser must be 
broken . . . . We should declare ourselves in support of their [the British] action.”376  
Ironically, granted under direct orders from civilian authority, Burke’s actions months 
later were diametrically opposed to this recommendation.  With the Israeli invasion of the 
Sinai on October 29, the American State Department began issuing evacuation orders to 
all U.S. citizens in Egypt.  To help with this withdrawal Burke ordered the U.S. Sixth 
Fleet to take position off the coast of Egypt.  Two days later as the British and French 
entered the fray, the commander of the Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles Brown, found 
himself in a precarious position.  With the Royal Navy and the RAF now actively 
engaging Egyptian ships, Burke ordered Brown to “prepare for imminent hostilities.”377  
When the perplexed Brown responded, “Am prepared for imminent hostilities, but which 
side are we on?”378  To the query Burke did not give a direct answer, he only told the 
Vice Admiral to, “take no guff from anyone.”379    
  Understanding the risk of a potentially life-threatening incident with anxious 
naval and air forces operating in such a close proximity, First Sea Lord Earl Mountbatten 
requested the withdrawal of the U.S. fleet after it completed its evacuation mission; the 
Americans demurred.  In fact, the actions of vessels and aircraft of the Sixth Fleet seemed 
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to invite an incident that so worried Mountbatten.   Throughout the days and nights 
leading up to the landing of British forces, numerous incidents of harassment towards the 
Royal Navy by American armed forces took place.   
As an engineer on the RFA (Royal Fleet Auxiliary) Retainer, W. H. Cameron, 
recounts, “They kept saying on the BBC news that there was no interference from the 
Americans but there was I saw it.”380  “On one occasion we were replenishing HMS 
Eagle when an American helicopter hovered about the deck of the Eagle,” Cameron 
recalls.381  He continues, “[I]t did not move away until a petty officer rushed to a multiple 
Bofors gun and swung the barrels directly on the helicopter which was only a few feet 
above it.”382  On another occasion occurring on November 2, the HMS Ulysses reported 
she had been, “continuously menaced in the past eight hours by US aircraft, flying low 
and as close as 400 yards.”383 In addition, British convoys found themselves utterly 
disrupted when American naval vessels blazingly sailed through their lines.384  These 
types of harassments were much more than minor nuances. With the British at a wartime 
footing, anything might have occurred in response to these reckless actions.  The chance 
of an American aircraft or vessel being mistaken as hostile Egyptian attacker remained 
constant.  If direct orders were given for these American measures against the Royal 
Navy, they have not yet been discovered or disclosed.  Whatever the motive for these 
actions, to treat these British servicemen as a plaything while they were entering the fray 
of battle just exemplified the American attitude to the United Kingdom at the moment; 
especially when it did not fall in line with the will of the United States. 
On November 5 at 7:15 in the morning, fifteen minutes after the U.N. Assembly 
resolution called for all hostilities to have ceased, British paratroopers landed four miles 
west of Port Said.385  Encountering little resistance, they sought to secure the airfields on 
the outskirts of the city for resupply and prepare for the landings of the main attack force.  
On the same day, Eisenhower received a message from Eden that the Englishman had 
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sent the night before.  In the letter, Eden, addressing the American president as “Dear 
Friend” opened with, “It is with great grief to me that the events of the last few days have 
placed such a strain on the relations between our two countries.”386  While showing 
remorse for their differences, the prime minister held that the invasion he had ordered 
was still justified, “I have always felt . . . that the Middle East was an issue over which, in 
the last resort, we would have to fight.”387  “I know that Foster thought we could have 
played this longer,” Eden continues, “But I am convinced that, if we allowed things to 
drift, everything would have gone from bad to worse.”388  He ended the letter quite 
fatefully with, “History alone can judge whether we have made the right decision.”389  
Eisenhower contemplated writing back but did not respond; in his estimation, events 
were moving too quickly to capture the moment.390  However, another foreign leader did 
take the time to write Eden on that fifth of November; and in the keeping with the 
tradition of Guy Fawkes, this man promised explosions. 
Initiating a bloody and cruel “re-invasion” of Hungary only two days earlier, the 
leadership of the Soviet Union openly reveled over the Anglo-America split by 
November 5.391  With the Western alliance fractioned over the Suez Crisis, the Soviets 
found this the perfect time to quell the anti-Russian sentiment sweeping their once 
stalwart Warsaw Pact ally.  Unable to coordinate a unified front, and busy working 
against each other over affairs in Egypt, the Atlantic alliance did little more than protest 
this belligerent act of the Soviet Union.  As British and American diplomats and 
politicians squabbled, thousands of Hungarians valiantly died.  Even more despicable 
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was that while the Soviet Union was conducting this vile suppression in Eastern Europe, 
the Americans were by default allied with the U.S.S.R in their attempts to impede the 
welfare of their closest allies, France and Britain. Writing to Dulles, the American 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Charles Bohlen, said as much.  “One of the most 
disagreeable features of the present situation,” Bohlen stated of the ongoing Suez Crisis, 
“is finding ourselves on the same side of this question with the Soviets.”392  In both the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, the United States and the Soviet Union 
voted alongside each other against the interests of these two vital members of NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization).  Too many, including almost certainly Anthony 
Eden, must have viewed this as a world turned upside down.   
Secure in his belief that the United States had entirely abandoned the United 
Kingdom over the British intervention in Egypt, the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent 
an alarming letter to Anthony Eden that the Englishman received the same day British 
troops engaged the Egyptians.  The message is nothing but chilling: 
In what position would Britain have found herself if she herself had been attacked 
by powerful states possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon?  And 
there are countries now which need not have sent a navy or air force to the coasts 
of Britain, but could have used other means, such as rocket technique.  We are 
filled with determination to use force to crush the aggressors and to restore peace 
in the East.  We hope you will show the necessary prudence and will draw from 
this the appropriate conclusions.393 
 
The threat of nuclear war appeared evident.394  Although Eden did not take the message 
literally, it did rattle many in the American Government.395  Without the public splitting 
of the Anglo-American alliance, it is hard to conceive Bulganin would have even 
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contemplated sending such a menacing warning.  However, the Soviets did not stop there, 
on the same day in Moscow Ambassador Bohlen received a message from Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dmitri Shepilov for forwarding to Eisenhower.396  As Bohlen 
describes, “the note proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union join in a 
common action – the implication was military action – if necessary against France and 
Britain, America’s two closest allies.”397  White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams 
summarizes the communication the same. He states the message proposed that, “Russia 
and the United States should form a military alliance to stop the British and French 
invasion of Egypt.”398  Although the White House called the proposal “unthinkable” in a 
statement on the letter, the mere attempt of such a bizarre proposal only reiterates how 
much the United States had left their European allies to twist in the international wind.399   
 In the predawn darkness of November 6, over two hundred ships waited at battle 
stations for sunrise.400  Not far from this massive Anglo-French armada lay around fifty 
vessels of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.401  Remaining aloof, the American naval ships, now 
finished with their evacuation mission, rode anchor waiting for orders.  Kyle Keith 
writes, “The long shadow of the Sixth Fleet, the ever-present symbol of American 
disapproval, fell ominously across the path of [Operation] Musketeer.”402  If commanded 
to stop the invasion the Americans were ready -- but not willing.  As Admiral Burke 
cautioned the State Department, “We can stop them but we will have to blast the hell out 
of them.” 403 He continued, “If we are going to threaten, if we’re going to turn on them, 
then you’ve got to be ready to shoot.  We can do that.  We can defeat them.”404 
Thankfully, cooler heads in Washington prevailed; orders soon arrived calling for the 
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American Fleet to sail to calmer waters.405  At this critical moment, the Anglo-American 
dispute mercifully stayed cold.     
With the arrival of first light, the shelling of Port Said began; British troops 
landed shortly afterward.406  The moment the Americans, Russians, and Egyptians had 
fiercely worked against and fundamentally feared finally arrived; the British lion, despite 
their best efforts, roared.  Quickly cutting through initial Egyptian resistance, the 
vanguard of the expeditionary force was already fighting their way through the streets of 
Port Said as the bulk of the Anglo-French forces streamed ashore.407  By mid-day, all the 
preliminary objectives were met with the strategic city fully in the hands of the British.  
Armor columns thundered through the desert, hell-bent on capturing the entire Suez 
Canal.408  Victory seemed assured.  Then a little after 1 p.m. (Egyptian time), the 
commander of the expedition, General Charles Knightley, received a peculiar order from 
London.  It changed everything. 
From the outset of the crisis, Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
had been one of the most vocal members of the British government advocating military 
intervention against Nasser.409  However, by November 6, this viewpoint of the 
Chancellor radically changed; seemingly overnight this vicious hawk had transformed 
into a callow dove.  Throughout the months of September and October 1956, the foreign 
dollar reserves of the United Kingdom had fallen to respectively 57 million and 84 
million.410  With concern over the potential state of the British economy if the Suez Canal 
closed and general investor uncertainty, these losses were in Macmillan’s estimation 
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“tolerable.”411  However, in the first week of November intense pressure on the sterling 
put Britain’s financial well-being into dire straits.  Due to the massive selling of the 
pound on international markets, the losses to the British monetary reserves estimated in 
November “were to be $279 million, if not wholly, in the first few days.”412  This figure 
constituted a loss of over one-eighth of their remaining total -- gone in less than a 
week.413   
A run on sterling seemed inevitable due to the precarious international situation 
Britain found itself in, however, the amount of selling points to market manipulation by 
an influential group, namely, the American government.414  In his memoirs, Macmillan 
speculates that the United States Treasury might have played a hand in this massive 
dumping of the pound.  He also states, “the selling by the [U.S.] Federal Reserve Bank 
seemed far above what was necessary as a precaution to protect the value of its holdings.”  
Facing a looming currency crisis or a forced devaluation of the pound, the United 
Kingdom needed a massive loan of foreign capital quickly to save its economy from utter 
ruin.  Sadly, for Britain, America held the purse strings. 
Even more troubling to the fate of the United Kingdom, but only just a little less 
immediate, was its ability to purchase oil.  Even as British land forces rushed to seize the 
Suez Canal, their mission, in one aspect, was already a failure.  Prior to the Anglo-French 
invasion, Nasser already ordered the sinking of numerous ships throughout the waterway, 
incapacitating it for the foreseeable future.  Even with the speedy capture of the Canal, it 
would take the British and French weeks to restore it to working order.  In this interval, 
the U.K. required petroleum from Western Hemisphere sources.  Unlike the Middle 
Eastern nations that accepted the pound for oil, the countries in the Americas -- including 
the United States -- required payment in American dollars.  By November 6, with the 
Bank of England bleeding foreign capital in order to keep the pound afloat, the nation 
simply did not have the funds to pay for this vital import of oil in dollars.  With strategic 
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reserves of petroleum running low, it was only a matter of time until the British Isles 
ground to a halt.                
The British government had two options in attempting to gain the treasuries it 
desperately needed.  These consisted of either a direct loan from the United States or 
withdrawing the British quota from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- money the 
U.K. had already paid into the fund.415  On both fronts, Macmillan met stalwart resistance 
by the Americans. During a telephone call on November 6, Secretary of the Treasury 
George Humphrey told him help would only be forthcoming if the British agreed to an 
immediate cease-fire.416  In addition, news reached Macmillan that the U.S. vetoed 
British withdrawals from its IMF fund.417  No other avenues were left for Britain to turn 
down; point blank the nation needed American financial assistance.  Only, as the United 
States government made crystal clear, none was forthcoming unless Eden called off the 
invasion.  With Anglo-French incursion still only hours old, Macmillan, once one of the 
firmest advocates for military intervention, headed into a Cabinet meeting on November 
6 determined to promote an immediate cease-fire.  In the meeting, Eden, now showing 
signs of severe physical illness, relented to the inevitable.   
Without consulting his French or Israeli allies, the British prime minister ordered 
a cessation of hostilities and for an informal cease-fire to begin at midnight November 
7.418  Although dissenters in the Cabinet urged for pushing on at all costs, their pleas fell 
on deaf ears.  While Eden later lamented that maybe he had ordered the armistice too 
soon, at the time escalating economic and diplomatic pressure seemed insurmountable.419  
In addition, with the British finally bowing to the urgent requests from the United States 
for a cease-fire, Eden believed that Eisenhower would now support and protect the 
interests of the United Kingdom going forward.  Writing on this point, Macmillan states, 
“We hoped that the United States would now pursue, if not a friendly, at least neutral and 
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perhaps even a constructive course.”  As he later confessed, he was dead wrong on that 
supposition: “We could hardly foresee that the United States Government would harden 
against us on almost every point and become harsher after the cease fire than before.”420  
On November 6, with the actual fighting coming to a halt, the crucible that Great Britain 
endured was not quite over. 
Humiliation and abject failure seemed the only penance the Americans were 
willing to accept from the British for the failure of their not bending to the expressed will 
of the United States during the Suez Crisis.  As Macmillan writes, “We were now forced 
along a slow retreat on almost every point, accompanied by humiliations almost 
vindictively inflicted upon on us at the instance of the United States Government.”421  
This anti-British policy of the United States surfaced almost immediately after the cease-
fire.  Wounds over the crisis ran deep on both sides; however, only the Americans were 
in a position to administer immediate revenge.     
In a conciliatory phone on the evening of November 7, Eden sought to mend 
fences with the newly reelected Eisenhower; the previous day they had spoken when 
Eden told Eisenhower about his decision to submit to the U.N. ordered cease-fire.422  The 
November 6 conversion had been tense and to the point. Worried about surviving a 
forthcoming no-confidence vote in the Commons, Eden told Eisenhower, “If I survive 
tonight I will call you tomorrow.”423  In the next day’s exchange, hoping to reinforce the 
Anglo-American relationship publicly, the Englishman suggested to the American 
president that they meet in Washington for talks in the near future.424  Eisenhower, in a 
jovial mood over his day’s overwhelming election victory, readily agreed to such a 
meeting.  He also urged Eden not to fret over their disagreements for “after all it is just a 
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family spat.”425  For Anthony Eden it appeared the road to reconciliation seemed assured.  
Yet shortly after the phone conversation, a message arrived stating due to pressing 
internal affairs the proposed conference between the two leaders must be postponed 
indefinitely.426 
Even with an official cease-fire in place, the British still occupied the territory 
they had captured from the Egyptians.  Eden believed that this continued presence near 
the Suez Canal remained the only bargaining chip for his nation in exacting any 
concessions for its extremely expensive, but short, military endeavor.  Eisenhower found 
this position totally unacceptable.  Over the forthcoming days, the United States 
continually demanded the complete withdrawal of the 22,000 soldiers now positioned in 
and around Port Said.  Tethering this insistent request with the offer of financial 
assistance to the British economy, the Americans effectively sought to blackmail the 
United Kingdom into complying with this U.S. stipulation.  “The Americans,” Macmillan 
states, “not content with the ‘cease-fire,’ were now demanding an immediate 
evacuation.”427  He goes on to write,  “[Secretary of Treasury] Humphrey made it clear to 
me that he would maintain his opposition to any drawing from the International Monetary 
Fund or support means of loan, until the British and French troops had left Egypt.”428  As 
on November 6, the Americans were again tightening the economic screws to their 
European ally.     
At the United Nations, the British did not fare any better.  In resolutions calling 
for the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Sinai Peninsula, America voted 
again with the Soviet Union and against the United Kingdom.  As Eden writes of his 
opinion on this turn of events, “The United States and Soviet Russia joined together in 
the General Assembly to issue their instructions on Suez . . . the fact that the United 
States and Russia were together did not mean that they were right.”429  However, by then 
Eden’s objections or disapprovals mattered little to those holding real power over the 
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situation; leverage held by Eisenhower, and now also Nasser, guaranteed the eventual 
capitulation of the British position.     
Here again, the United Kingdom’s dependence on foreign oil contributed 
significantly to its defeat.  Eden’s order to halt the invasion prior to British forces gaining 
control of the Suez Canal thwarted Anglo-French plans to clear it.  After the cease-fire, 
seventeen sunken ships and two destroyed bridges still blocked any passage through the 
waterway.430  Nasser declared that no attempts to clear the canal would start until all 
Anglo-French forces left Egyptian soil.431   Without the reopening of the Suez Canal, 
limited access to Middle Eastern oil still left Great Britain needing petroleum from 
sources in the Western Hemisphere.  Here Eisenhower again did not relent; Eden states, 
“The United States would not extend help or support to Britain until after a definite 
statement on withdrawal had been made.” 432  Left with little choice, British forces started 
withdrawing to bases in Cyprus on December 3.  Three days before Christmas, in an 
unceremonious departure reminiscent of another only seven months prior, British armed 
forces again vacated their presence in Egypt.433  Only then, on December 27, did Nasser 
order clearance on the Suez Canal to begin.434  This last defeat ended the Suez Crisis.     
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
FORTINBRAS RISING 
 
 
“Far-called, our navies melt away; on dune and headland sinks the fire: 
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday, is one with Nineveh and Tyre!” 
Rudyard Kipling, Recessional 
 
“A little more than kin, and less than kind”  
William Shakespeare, Hamlet 
 
On November 16, as the workings of the British withdrawal from the Suez were 
still under way, Selwyn Lloyd visited John Foster Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital in 
Washington D.C.435  On November 2, the American Secretary of State, suffering serve 
abdominal pains, had admitted himself to the hospital.436  It confirmed the start of one 
situation the wily Dulles could not negotiate himself out of; the yet undiagnosed cancer 
eventually proved terminal.  In the meeting with Lloyd, he appeared friendly to his 
British counterpart, but not willing to concede any favorable terms to the Anglo-French 
position.  Unexpectedly, as Lloyd recounts, Dulles, “with a kind twinkle in his eye,” 
asked the Englishman a stunningly blunt question that left Lloyd dumbfounded.   Staring 
directly at Lloyd, the American asked, “Selwyn, why did you stop?  Why didn’t you go 
through with it and get Nasser down?”437  Lloyd writes of the moment, “If ever there was 
an occasion when one could have been knocked down by the proverbial feather, this was 
it.”438  Responding to the query, Lloyd told Dulles, “Well, Foster, if you had so much as 
winked at us we might have gone on.”439  To this, Dulles with a smile said he could have 
never done that.440   
One not reveling in the failure of the British cause due to unrelenting American 
pressure was Anthony Eden.   Having also taken violently ill, the prime minister on 
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November 19 retreated to Jamaica in a bid to recuperate.441  When he returned to Britain, 
his days as leader of Her Majesty’s Government were effectively numbered.  Unlike 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Dwight Eisenhower, who went on to lead their respective 
nations for years to come, Eden paid the ultimate political price for his failure.   On 
January 9, citing ill health, he resigned in disgrace and was succeeded by Harold 
Macmillan.442  However, the stigma of the failure of Suez did not die with the departure 
of Eden like Banquo’s ghost it lingered over the British Isles for many years to come.                        
With Eden quietly exiting stage left, the man who first heeded to American 
pressure to halt the Suez invasion now governed Britannia.  Walking lock step with the 
United States during his premiership, Macmillan kept Britain consistently tethered to the 
interests of America.  Eden later stated that the foreign policies of his successor relegated 
the mighty British Empire to the 51 state of the USA.  British historian John Darwin 
argues, “The 1960s were a dismal decade for British diplomacy.  Despite the boastful 
proclamation of Harold Macmillan and his successors that Britain would remain a global 
power come what may, the reality was an unbroken diet of humble pie.”443  Macmillan’s 
refusal to risk another Suez-like confrontation with the United States over continued 
attempts of the British to hold onto their overseas colonies swung the door wide open for 
these territories to gain their independence.  The “winds of change” Macmillan initiated 
swept the Empire almost clearly off the face of the map.444  Without the substantial 
leverage of its colonies, a united Europe now seemed an inviting avenue for the British to 
venture down.   
The day that Eden under American economic pressure ended the invasion, Guy 
Mollet -- frustrated over the abandonment of his nation by the U.S. -- found solace in the 
words of the Prime Minister of West Germany Konrad Adenauer.  The German told 
Mollet that a united “Europe would be his revenge;” meaning with the consolidation of 
the trading and political powers of the European nations in a collective organization 
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America would not be able to run roughshod over France anymore.445  David Reynolds 
states, “France’s irritation with NATO and its enthusiasm for a European Community 
were both greatly accentuated by the crisis.”446  The idea appealed to many British as 
well and undoubtedly influenced their decision to join the European Common Market in 
1973.  Also, with the specter of Suez firmly imprinted in its psyche, the United Kingdom 
found a little molecule of revenge against its American ally.  As the war in Vietnam 
reached its height in the late 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson sought British military 
forces to join in the anti-communist cause.447  Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
resoundingly refused.448  The reversal of fortune from 1956 to 1968 for the Americans 
only served, in some respects, as fitting justice.  
Despite the trauma the Suez debacle played on the British psyche, not all of its 
effects lasted endlessly.  In 1982, a different dictator sought to “nationalize” the Falkland 
Islands.   As in 1956, again the British lion roared.  Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 
Argentina Junta did not survive its fury.  Like Anthony Eden another Conservative Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, laid the prestige of the British nation on the line; but 
contrasting Eden, Thatcher succeeded.    Then in 1990, with the Gulf War, and again in 
2004, with the controversial invasion of Iraq, the British army, the Royal Navy, and the 
RAF returned to the Middle East to once more do battle with an Arabic tyrant.449 
Regarding this last event, many critics of Tony Blair have even made a comparison of his 
actions leading up to the Iraqi war with those of Eden’s during 1956.450  The battle scars 
of the British disaster at Suez were long lasting, yet as with all things, time had erased -- 
for good or ill -- some of their lingering influences.            
                                                          
445 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 
20th Century, (London: Longman House, 1991), 205. 
446 Ibid. 
447 Rhiannon Vickers, “Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in 
Vietnam,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 10, Number 2 (Spring, 2008), 46-47. 
448 Dominic Sandbrook, White Heat: A History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties 
1964-1970 (London: Abacus, 2009), 337. 
449 Martin Woollacoot, After Suez: Adrift in the American Century (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2006), 117, 139. 
450 British Broadcasting Corporation Television, The Other Side of Suez (2006). 
109 
 
From the earliest days of Great Rapprochement to the Cold War era of the Special 
Relationship, Anglo-American relations rested on mutual interests.  On the vast majority 
of occasions the United States and Great Britain found common cause in their foreign 
relations and worked together to achieve a communal goal.  Countless battles during the 
World Wars attest to this fact.  However, when the national advantage of one of these 
powers stood opposed to the other, the Atlantic alliance rapidly and unceremoniously 
broke down.  Here the disputes over Indochina, American challenges to the British 
gaining an atom bomb, and the disagreements over China and First Offshore Crisis 
confirm this supposition.  William Pearson writes, “While tied together by a mutual fear 
of Soviet expansionism, it is clear that London and Washington were bound to come into 
conflict in the 1950s.”451  With Egypt and the Suez Canal playing such a vital role in the 
maintenance of the British Empire, it made logical sense for the Anglo-American 
struggle to flashpoint here.  As the U.S. government sought to gain allies against the 
Soviet Union, Egypt, and its leader Nasser, naturally appeared as prime candidates. 
As the crisis heated up, appearances mattered more and more to the United States 
and Great Britain.  To turn back once the United Kingdom initiated mobilization for a 
forthcoming Egyptian invasion would give the impression of failure.  Once Anthony 
Eden assembled the dogs of war, they needed unleashing; anything less than that reeked 
of appeasement.  On the other side of the Atlantic, perceptions spurred the United States 
to halt its ally at practically all costs.  Fearful of labeled a supporter of British colonialism 
in the eyes of the world, Eisenhower believed the U.S. needed to stop Eden from 
achieving Britain’s goals during the crisis.  The events of the second half of 1956 proved 
Eisenhower successful.  “Looking backward to those days,” the American president 
writes of Suez, “it is easy to see that the British and French won battles but nothing 
else.”452  On that point, thanks to efforts of himself and his nation, Eisenhower is exactly 
right.                               
An unsentimental review of the Anglo-America diplomacy leading up to 1956, a 
stark look at the British position in Egypt, and a recounting of the events of the actual 
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crisis proves overwhelmingly that the United States -- for selfish motives -- 
systematically guaranteed the failure of the United Kingdom in achieving its objectives 
during the Suez Crisis.  The argument is abundantly clear; however, the supposed 
justification for the actions of Eisenhower and Dulles might need elaboration.  One could 
argue that the Americans had a moral duty to prohibit their ally from violating 
international law.   However, it is difficult to give much credence to this supposition 
when examining the historical facts.  On this basis, the United States could hardly play 
the role of upright protector for national sovereignty.  In fact, encroaching into the affairs 
of an autonomous nation never seemed to bother Eisenhower prior to the attempt by Eden 
to remove Nasser.  In the consecutive years of 1953 and 1954, the American government 
vigorously pursued and achieved the overthrow of two world leaders they deemed 
unsuitable.  The Central Intelligence Agency’s participation in regime changes in Iran 
and Guatemala cannot be discounted.  While it might first seem reasonable to take the 
moral high ground in defending the American actions during the Suez Crisis, it is 
unfortunately not that black and white.                                        
The story of the Suez is far from having its last chapter written.  Writing over 
forty years ago, Geffrey Murray bemoaned, “So much has been written about the steep 
hill of Suez that anyone presuming to comment after seventeen years is bound to feel a 
sense of emptiness on the subject.”453  Times, however, has proven Murray a bit off the 
mark.  His attempt in closing the book on the historiography of the Suez Crisis remains 
premature.  Even now in the twenty-first century, the wealth of scholarly and popular 
works on the subject grows steadily each year.  As the desert winds still swirled under the 
blades of departing helicopters taking the last British troops back to Cyprus, Suez began 
capturing the imagination of journalists and historians, and that captivation has yet to 
diminish.  Much of this interest and fascination comes from the cinematic allure of the 
crisis to American and British enthusiasts.  Numerous commentators have cited aspects 
of the affair that rival those of then contemporary spy novels and latter-day techno-
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thrillers. As more and more previously held classified material of various governments 
involved in this mystery open to public eyes, layers of the onion peel away.  Yet as 
increasingly factual documentation is unearthed, it remains a tale with the potential of 
morphing into a legend.  Not unlike classical works based on actual events, the elements 
of a great tragedy are present at Suez.       
   In the last act of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the titular character takes up arms against 
the forces tearing away his birthright and destroying the kingdom of Denmark.  Beset by 
powerful enemies from the beginning, the prince, after much handwringing, finally seeks 
his revenge.  In the final scene he gallantly gives his life in this effort, losing everything 
but his sense of duty.  Anyone only slightly familiar with the story of Hamlet knows 
these basic series of events.  However, an often forgotten plot point of the play is who 
inherits the throne and kingdom that Hamlet sacrifices in order to preserve.  For the 
pathos of the story, it is but a minor detail; the audience comes for the tale of the “mad 
prince” not the political situation left in his wake.   Cut from almost all productions of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet is the real foil of the protagonist, Fortinbras of Norway.  Heralded 
as an imposing leader and a constant danger to the security of the kingdom, the often 
forgotten Fortinbras is literally the last man standing as the curtain falls.  In 
Shakespeare’s original version, directly after the tragic death of Hamlet, Fortinbras, 
having done nothing to support or aid the hero, enters and claims Hamlet’s mantle as his 
own.     
Although Anthony Eden is certainly no Hamlet in the parable, America eases 
quite effortlessly into the role of Fortinbras.  After the British fiasco at Suez, the United 
States effectively took over the mantle of the West in the eyes of the world.  As Britain 
fought to retain its Anglo-centric Empire, the U.S. at the very least only waited to pick up 
the pieces.  During the Suez affair the Americans did far worse, there they actively 
sought the ruin of British interests.  Here a cynical individual might say they actually 
played the part of a treacherous Iago over the opportunistic Fortinbras.  Granted, the 
warning signs were always flashing for Eden and the British.  Countless times 
Eisenhower and Dulles implored their Atlantic cousins to restrain themselves, but the 
ominous messages went disregarded.  Yet as the Gotterdammerung of Suez fell upon the 
112 
 
British Empire, the American Republic did not lament the flames engulfing their defiant 
ally. 
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